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Republicans Call For Creation of Right Wing

94P20748A Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 14 Apr 94 p 1

["Resolution of the National Council of the Albanian Republican Party"]

[Text] The National Council of the Albanian Republican Party, held on 8 April 1994, reviewed the activity of the steering committee in connection with the political situation in the country and some aspects of economic development. After much open discussion, the Council reached the following conclusions:

1. Political tensions have increased as a result of the abstractionism of the Socialist Party, clothed in the garments of renewal, and the abstractionism of its allies. Communism is still present in Albania. The "renewal" of the Socialists, imposed by time, is demagogy.

2. The efforts to bring the country out of the crisis have produced some good results with the general orientation to the free market but the optimal solution has not yet been achieved. The optimal solution can be achieved only by means of the republican program, which is based on the recognition and return of private property and, especially, ownership of the land.

3. The party in power, which has the heavy burden of governing the country, is continuing to develop a tendency to monopolize administrative leadership and political life, with a restraining effect on the development of democracy and the effective use of intellectual potential. This has paved the way for left-wing phenomena and recidivist elements from the past.

4. Corruption has taken on alarming proportions for the present and future of the country. Efforts to combat these manifestations, especially in the area of privatization, have been ineffective.

5. The Republican Party provided all types of assistance to the alliance of the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, and the Social Democratic Party, an alliance which was created at the time of the struggle for the overthrow of the communist government, and regarded this alliance as a compass for democratic developments. Under the present conditions, there is no hope that this alliance can be repeated. The Republican Party is in favor of cooperation with the Democratic Party if this party creates true conditions for real and sincere cooperation.

6. Keeping in mind the country's great interest in internal stability and foreign credibility, the Republican Party supports the government coalition, which guarantees general democratic developments. This does not prevent the Republican Party from freely stating its opinions and providing constructive opposition on all matters which are not in accord with its program.

7. The National Council is convinced that the creation of a right wing in Albania is necessary today because:

—the right wing will be an effective counterbalance to the unproclaimed alliance of the left-wing forces which, under various labels and slogans, are aiming to reestablish the socialist form of government.

—only the right wing can carry out free capitalist development, beginning with the recognition and return of legal ownership.

—under current political conditions, only the right wing can represent a true democratic opposition.

—during the past year, in particular, the foreign policy of the Albanian state in the defense of the country has followed a correct line. However, this policy will receive the necessary strength through coordination with the right wing's clear ideas on the country.

The leadership of the party is charged with engaging in discussions with right-wing political parties and associations to formulate joint guidelines and action plans on the basis of political reality and national interests.

8. The Republican Party will increase its struggle, in an effective manner, for the return of property and, first, for the enactment of a just land law. The republican concept of ownership must be extended over the entire economic spectrum. At the same time, the Republican Party must anticipate the problems resulting from capitalist development.

9. The Republican Party will work with perseverance to attract intellectuals into its ranks and management. The party's central headquarters and the party press are being reorganized and oriented on the basis of the guidelines in this resolution.

10. The membership of Arben Babameto, Arben Brace, Arsen Proko, Durim Kulli, and Neritan Alibali on the party's steering committee is approved.

Minister on Foreign Investment Advantages

94P20659A Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 1 Apr 94 p 12

[Interview with Finance Minister Pirro Dishnica by Golik Trebeshina; place and date not given: "Advantages for Foreign Investments"]

[Excerpts] [Trebeshina] What was the economic situation inherited by Albania and what are the aims of the democratic government in expanding economic reforms in the country?

[Dishnica] [passage omitted] When the democratic government came into power in April 1992, an overall program was undertaken to implement a policy of transition to the market economy. The government put its entire intellectual arsenal into implementing this program and we are all witnesses to the noticeable economic successes of the government: the fight against inflation, the continuing efforts to control the budget deficit by means of a rigorous policy on expenditures, and the

presentation of a tax system based on the market economy, restrictions on bank loans, bank interest rates based on the rules of the market, and the restoration of confidence in the country's monetary unit. It should be stressed that in the implementation of this program, considerable financial assistance was obtained from abroad, such as the "standby" agreement with the IMF. After the successful implemention of this agreement, it became possible to sign a medium-term agreement (ESAF) with the IMF in July 1993, for assistance in the medium-term program of economic reform. There was also the World Bank loan for critical imports and the EC support for the balance of payments.

At the same time, a number of foreign countries provided food assistance and humanitarian aid and carried out development and technical assistance projects, in particular Italy, the United States, Germany, Turkey, and other G-24 countries. [passage omitted]

The government's budget deficit decreased from 40 percent of the GDP at the beginning of the economic stabilization program in the first half of 1992 to less than 10 percent in the first half of 1993. These favorable results were achieved by implementing tight control over expenditures. Even though the budget deficit is still high, the results so far show that the process of reducing the budget deficit continues.

Since 1992 the external debt of Albania has been less than planned due to fewer imports and improvements in exports. Exports are expected to be 25 percent higher in 1993 than in 1992. There were shortfalls and delays in medium-term and long-term financing but they were partially compensated for by private transfers of funds and the receipt of more capital than was planned. Another positive development is the inclusion of the private sector in foreign trade. Currently the private sector dominates imports and plays a big role in exports. In this framework, noticeable progress has been made in the implementation of the price policy and the reduction of budgetary subsidies. In general, retail and wholesale prices have been liberalized. The policy of increasing prices is aimed at reducing the obstacles to increasing production and imports.

[Trebeshina] What are the developmental parameters of the Albanian government's economic program?

[Dishnica] Our data indicates that production has stopped decreasing and that there are signs of an increase. In particular, agriculture has shown noticeable signs of improvement in response to price reform and privatization. After the privatization of cooperatives and the liberalization of prices of food products, the attention of the government has been concentrated on the privatization and restructuring of state farms, the completion of the price reform for agricultural products, the rehabilitation of the rural infrastructure, and the privatization of distribution and processing enterprises. The World Bank and other donors are close collaborators in the execution of this reform. The privatization and restructuring of state farms and the raising of the prices of agricultural inputs up to the level of imports are priority targets. It should be stressed that the measures to transform the Agriculture and Development Bank into a new institution, completely subject to the law on banks, are of special importance for the role which this bank will play in providing support for the new structures in agriculture. In the government's program, the infrastructure has remained within the financial limitations on the basis of the general opinion that the largest part of the public infrastructure of Albania is inadequate for the development of a modern economy and for attracting investments in various branches of the economy.

Although the transportation system has been evaluated as adequate, on the whole it is far from meeting the essential quality parameters and conditions have become so bad that economic development is hindered. The government is placing a priority on repairing the main highways and expanding roads in the mountainous areas, reconstructing the port of Durres and the Rinas Airport, and, in particular, constructing international highways such as the Durres-Skopje-Sofia highway with a branch leading to Kapshtice or Durres-Kakavije. I would like to add here that a positive sign of the rapid development of the transportation sector is the predominance of private transporters in interurban transportation and international transportation of passengers and goods.

The telecommunications infrastructure in Albania is very limited. In the framework of the master plan, for the execution of a $30-million program financed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and by Italy, Switzerland, and Austria, there will be restructuring; it is thought that resources will be found for the rapid installation of modern telecommunications systems, which is an essential condition for attracting investors and tourists.

There has been noticeable improvement in the construction field, both in the villages and in the cities. Private investments by individuals are predominant in this area. To eliminate the lack of housing and to improve the quality of existing housing, the government has aimed at increasing the role of the private sector and improving the costs. A law aiming at the rapid privatization of the inventory of housing units has been passed and is being implemented. To provide incentive for the private construction of housing, rents for newly constructed housing units have been liberalized. Work has resumed on the completion of the construction of apartments which were being built. By the end of September 1993, some 1,451 apartments were completed and handed over for use. During the same period, investments of more than 713,000 leks were made. Some 8,401 housing units and 24,090 economic units have been built by private concerns and many others are in the process of construction.

The privatization program aims at increasing private activity in two directions:

a. the creation of private enterprise activities in the entire economy, without any restrictions, and

b. the privatization of state property.

To accelerate the process of privatization within the strategic framework, the law on privatization has been reviewed, there have been reorganizations of structures directly concerned with privatization, and an incentive-providing fiscal policy has been implemented. The enactment of the laws on the bankruptcy of enterprises and on the return and compensation of owners are expected to have a positive influence in this area. Despite the objective difficulties which have appeared, all efforts are being made to provide compensation as soon as possible by means of bonds and to create opportunities for bondholders to take part in the privatization process.

[Trebeshina] How does the legal system create an appropriate climate for the economic development of Albania and, in this context, how does it provide guarantees for foreign investors?

[Dishnica] The legislative system for the market economy is rapidly being created. During the past year, the parliament approved the law on commercial companies, a banking law, a law on the Bank of Albania, a law on bankruptcy, the law on accounting, as well as labor legislation. Finally, we have approved a liberal law on foreign investments which facilitates registration procedures. The main thing is that any disagreements will always be resolved by international law. Laws on taxes and customs have been rewritten so that they are fully suited to the market economy. The increase in investments by borrowing foreign capital is one of the most important actions for putting the economy back on its feet. Despite the problems which have appeared, foreign firms and investors have had an increasing interest in Albania. Firms with a total investment of about $50 million, part of $100 million in contracts, have signed contracts and begun their activities. Other firms have concluded contracts for a total investment of $70 million and are expected to begin their activity.

The government is constantly trying to create an attractive atmosphere for foreign investments. In the foreign investment law, foreign investments and investors are treated the same as Albanians. In addition, foreign investors are not subject to controls over capital and are free to transfer their profits. Soon all investors who invest in the production sector will not have to pay taxes for a four-year period and this period will be extended for those firms which reinvest and for those firms which invest in the tourismn sector. In addition, investors will profit from liberal exemptions from customs taxes for goods which are used in the investment creation process. At present, foreigners can rent land for 99 years at a reasonable price and, for some projects, they can buy land. The foreign investment law stipulates that disagreements connected with expropriation or compensation for expropriation or discrimination will be resolved by international bodies such as the International Center for the Resolution of Investment Conflicts. Another more important point is the exemption from procedures for seeking authorization to make an investment, procedures which still exist, even today, in some Eastern European countries, such as Romania, Poland, and others. I am convinced that the approval of the civil code which will permit private ownership of the land and the rights which result from this ownership will give a new incentive to foreign investors to come to Albania.

In conclusion, I would like to say that many bilateral investments and tax agreements have been signed by our government to facilitate foreign investments, with all those countries whose investors have or will have an interest in investing in Albania.

Meksi Congratulates Italy's Berlusconi

AU1105161194 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 11 May 94

[Text] Albanian Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi today sent a telegram greeting new Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. After expressing his special pleasure and warm greetings on the creation of the Italian governmental cabinet, the telegram expresses wishes of successes to the benefit of the Italian people.

Meksi also expresses his conviction that the affinity existing between the wing presided over by Berlusconi and the Albanian Government that he presently leads will be able to contribute to the traditional friendship that ties both peoples.

In his telegram, Meksi says: This makes me hope that this friendship will be raised to a higher level. I would like to hope that the generosity that Italy has shown toward Albania will continue and the close cooperation between both countries will be further strengthened for the common interest, ends the greeting telegram that Albanian prime minister has sent to Prime Minister Berlusconi on the occasion of the creation of the new Italian governmental cabinet.

Chrome Unions Demand Compensation for Embargo

94P20742A Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 14 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by the press spokesman of the Ministry of Industry, Mining, and Energy Sources: "The Chrome Industry Has Prospects for Development in the Market Economy"]

[Text] Representatives of the Independent Trade Union of Miners in Albania, led by Asllan Myshku; the trade union of the chrome corporation, led by Sabah Pata; the "Albkrom" corporation; and the Ministry of Labor, Emigration, and Social Assistance, along with the deputy minister of industry, mining, and energy resources,

Albert Brokaj, have held a meeting in Bulqize, in the largest mining center of the chrome extraction and processing industry.

During this meeting representatives of these trade unions, which belong to the Union of Independent Trade Unions of Albania, led by President Valer Xheka, brought up some important issues related to the collective labor contract, which they said was signed in a unilateral manner. They also raised issues related to production, the opening up of new jobs, the financing of new projects dealing with the development and future of the chrome extraction and processing industry, the urgent need to update technology, the creation of a joint enterprise, and possibilities for privatization. They wanted to know why workers in the corporation have not received 20-percent wage increases in accordance with the government decision. They were concerned about the sale of chrome, chrome concentrate, and ferrochrome, about the consequences of the embargo [against Yugoslavia] in the chrome extraction and processing industry and about the satisfaction, as soon as possible, of demands for housing and for the improvement of the miners' living and working conditions.

The participants in the meeting raised a number of other issues regarding the organization and management of work in the corporation and stressed the need for a bitter struggle against possible signs of corruption and for the further improvement of social assistance.

In their response, Deputy Minister Brokaj and the representatives of "Albkrom" and the Ministry of Labor, Emigration, and Social Assistance said that the government has drawn up a strategy for the chrome industry, which is a valuable national asset, and, therefore, the government has demonstrated and will continue to demonstrate concern for its continued development. It was pointed out that this corporation has had a higher hard currency income than any other corporation or production unit in the country and that the greater part of this income is used for the needs of the corporation. There are good possibilities for increasing this income.

It was stressed that the ministry must seek compensation from the United Nations for the serious consequences which this industry has suffered in the northeastern part of the country because of the embargo. At the end of the meeting the trade unions strongly stressed that a resolution containing the following demands should be issued:

—the collective contracts should be re-signed, with the participation of all the trade unions, especially the trade union of the corporation, which represents about 46 percent of the employees;

—the financial situation of the corporation should be improved by forgiving the taxes for 1992 and 1993;

—workers should receive a 26-percent wage increase;

—negotiations for the creation of a joint enterprise should be accelerated;

—additional funds should be sought from the government for the construction of the Klosi traverse bank, the ramp, and shaft No. 7, which are linked to the future of the mining industry;

—the price of energy for the chrome corporation, the largest consumer of energy, should be reduced;

—the headquarters of the corporation should be transferred to Bulqize and the retirement age for certain categories of workers should be lowered.

The demands in this resolution will be presented to the government. It was decided that the collective contract would be re-signed on 15 April 1994 at the corporation's headquarters in Tirana.

Yordanov Considers Dissolution of Assembly

AU1205181094 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 12 May 94

[Text] Our reporter Zlatina Georgieva has learned that National Assembly Chairman Aleksandur Yordanov has prepared a decision on discontinuing the prerogatives of the National Assembly on the basis of Article 86, Paragraph 1, and in connection with Article 64, Paragraph 3, and Article 98, Paragraph 1 of the Bulgarian Constitution. The decision has not yet been submitted to the National Assembly office.

The decision might sound strange, but legal experts in the National Assembly pointed out that according to the aforementioned articles the National Assembly could adopt such a decision and then adopt a special procedure for setting new elections, whose date should be fixed by the president of the Republic.

According to a member of the Radical Democratic Party, of which Yordanov also is a member, Yordanov's motives are related to the fact that the National Assembly is not adoptingthe important economic bills and is thus blocking reform in the country.

SDS Rejects Idea of Self-Dissolution

AU1205181394 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 12 May 94

[Text] After a stormy meeting behind closed doors, the parliamentary faction of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] rejected by a large majority, with four abstentions, the draft decision proposed by Edvin Sugarev on the self-dissolution of the National Assembly if Professor Berov's cabinet remains in power. This draft decision does not conform to the Bulgarian Constitution and would deceive the country. This was stated by Stefan Savov, chairman of the SDS parliamentary faction, after the meeting.

The proposal of Aleksandur Yordanov was not discussed because he withdrew it. Edvin Sugarev described that proposal as a joke.

DPS, GOR Note 'Similar Positions' on Cabinet

AU1205181494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 12 May 94

[Text] After their new meeting today the representatives of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] and the Civic Alliance for the Republic [GOR] declared that they have similar positions on the personnel and structural changes in the cabinet, our reporter Mariya Tsenkova reports. The final variant is expected on 13 or 17 May at the latest.

Ahmed Dogan and Aleksandur Tomov think that voting for the renewed cabinet could coincide with an agreement of the political forces to officially announce the date of the next parliamentary elections. Today or tomorrow the DPS will have consultations with the Bulgarian Socialist Party, while Aleksandur Tomov will meet tomorrow with representatives of the Alternative Social Liberal Party, Prime Minister Berov, and President Zhelev.

Air Force, PVO Organization Changes Seen

94CH0252B Prague A REPORT in Czech 5 Apr 94 p 8

[Article by Vlastimil Stana: "Air Force and Air Defense in the Next Century"]

[Text] Part of the change in the Czech Army is the transformation of the Air Force and Air Defense [PVO]. This complicated operation, which certainly will not take place without some radical cuts, and thus also some scars on the face of the Air Force and PVO, is the consequence of the changed strategic conditions and the real reduction of resources earmarked for the Army. All the changes that the Air Force and the PVO are currently undergoing are not the last ones. Already in existence are plans for the look of the department in about 1995, and concepts for the look of the Czech Air Force in the next century are also known. This was discussed at a news conference by Pavel Strubl, Air Force inspector and PVO general.

New Command System

One of the substantive changes is the creation of a three-step system of command. Basically it is composed of the staff of the Air Force and the PVO of the Army of the Czech Republic [ACR], which handles not only organization and command, but also formulates the concept and plans for the future development of the department. Established as operational steps, designed primarily for the immediate command of the units, were the 3d Tactical Air Corps with its command headquarters in Hradec Kralove, and the 4th PVO Corps (Stara Boleslav). The active component is represented by the Air Force squadrons and PVO units. Among the largest in the Air Force is the 31st Tactical Air Force Base (ZTL) in Caslav, the 32d ZTL base in Namest nad Oslavou, the 33d Helicopter Base in Prerov, and the 34th Air Force Training Base in Pardubice. The PVO corps is composed of the 4th Interceptor Aircraft base in Ceske Budejovice and the antiaircraft missile brigades and regiments located in Drnov, Brno, Ostrava, Rozmital pod Tremsinem, Kromeriz, and Strakonice.

Changes in the Air Force

On the basis of analyses and after weighing the human, financial, and material possibilities, the General Staff worked out a concept for the development of the Air Force and the PVO up to the year 2005.

In the case of the Air Force, it is assumed that this year there will be a radical reduction in aircraft inventory, and 77 fighter planes, 11 combat helicopters, 20 trainers, 10 transport and special planes, and 20 transport helicopters will be taken out of commission. Altogether, this will reduce the aircraft inventory by a full 30.6 percent! Next year the Air Force will be located at six airfields, and subsequently will have five permanent airfields at its disposal. The total number of 54 existing airfields will be reduced to 29. In addition to the five permanent ones, seven airfields will be occupied by airport administrations, nine airfields will have paved runways, and eight will have grassy surfaces.

The plans also include changes in the equipment of the Air Force. Two bases, those in Caslav and Namest, would have subsonic planes L-159 of Czech manufacture and supersonic multipurpose planes. In connection with this we learned that as of this year there are no more plans to operate MiG-29's, or to make any further purchases of Russian equipment. The multipurpose supersonic plane is definitely going to be a plane of Western manufacture. But it is premature to talk about the precise type of plane. The air transport base (Praha-Kbely) would be equiped with large-capacity long-range jets to provide passenger service for government officials, and with mid-range planes (for example, Hercules) designed to transport people, materiel, and paratroopers, including the rapid deployment brigade. Also available would be small-capacity mid-range planes (for example, L-610). The Prerov base, in addition to the helicopters, would be home to propeller planes Z-142, subsonic L-39's, and L-159's. The modernization of the air force will begin this year with the purchase of Z-142's.

Future of the PVO

Basic changes will take place above all in the combat and operational use of the signal, antiaircraft missile, and interceptor aircraft units. First of all, positional defense of installations will be abolished and replaced by defense of important regions, with the possibility of concentrating forces in the main operational direction.

There will be not only organizational changes in the PVO, but also reductions in the number of people and garrisons and an overall reduction in the cost of operations. The readiness system of the Czech Republic will thereafter be secured only by the signal corps and the interceptor aircraft units.

The current equipment of the PVO should serve until the year 2010, the equipment of the signal corps until the year 1998.

Battalion To Form Basis for Readiness Brigade

94CH0252C Prague A REPORT in Czech 4 Apr 94 p 8

Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Josef Prokes by Vladimir Marek; place and date not given: "Putting on a Beret Is Not Enough"]

[Text] *The Chrudim mechanized airborne battalion should become one of the main pillars of the readiness brigade. This was the reason we asked its commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Josef Prokes, for an interview.*

[Marek] Only recently you were the commander of the 71th airborne battalion. Without having to change places, you became practically overnight the commander of the 43d mechanized airborne brigade. What is the difference between these two units?

[Prokes] I would rather begin with what the two brigades have in common. They are located in Chrudim and they are airborne units. But they differ in their character and mission. The new brigade will be, as is, after all, indicated by its name, an airborne unit. It will therefore be possible to deploy it by parachute drop. But at the same time it also will be mechanized, which indicates its other possible insertion into combat—on personnel carriers.

[Marek] Will there be some difference in the training of the unit presently being formed compared to the former airborne battalion?

[Prokes] There will be no substantive difference in training. In certain areas the content will be changed. But these will be relatively small changes.

[Marek] Speaking about the names—isn't it a pity that the 71st battalion, which already has its own tradition, its image, is being renamed the 43d?

[Prokes] I agree with you, it is a pity. Number 71 has its own history, which goes back to World War II. We were interested in having it at least appear under its historic name. But in view of the reorganization and renumbering of the entire army it was impossible for our wish to be granted.

[Marek] You mentioned that the brigade is mechanized. What kind of equipment will it have?

[Prokes] Primarily wheeled, unarmored vehicles.

[Marek] What would these be at present?

[Prokes] For the time being, mainly UAZ all-terrain vehicles. Before long, however, we should be getting new equipment. Mentioned are Mercedes and other latest generation all-terrain vehicles.

[Marek] At the present time the battalion is being transformed and provided with additional troops. Will you be able to start training by 1 July 1994?

[Prokes] Basically, training was never interrupted, it goes on in perfect continuity. The battalion is merely being supplemented with additional servicemen. The deadlines for forming the unit are relatively short. However, I am convinced that we can meet them.

[Marek] Can you envision a situation when the parliament decides, for example in six months, to deploy the brigade in some combat mission? Would you be able to handle it?

[Prokes] As I said already, the brigade will be formed by 1 July. We shall meet that deadline.

[Marek] Are you satisfied with the quality of the people you are getting? Are they real professionals?

[Prokes] Most of the additional people we are getting have served in functions commensurate with those to which they are being assigned. The problem could be only in the fact that someone was, for example, a commander of a motorized rifle platoon and now he will command paratroopers. When we place a beret on an officer's head, it does not mean that he automatically becomes a paratrooper. He will have to learn some things. But if the person is only a little competent and has certain prerequisites, that should not present any great problems.

[Marek] Are these people in sufficiently good physical condition?

[Prokes] That is an individual matter. However, the majority of platoon commanders are young people who are in appropriate physical condition.

[Marek] Do you try to make the training as interesting as possible, make it as close to real combat conditions as possible?

[Prokes] It's not that we are trying. It is one of the basic principles which we have been following for a long time. There is much greater interest among the soldiers in that kind of training. When you are interested in what you are doing, it is much more effective than if it is merely something you are ordered to do.

[Marek] How many times a year, for example, does a soldier fire a submachine gun?

[Prokes] There is no firing range in Chrudim, and that is causing us some problems. We have to travel to one. In spite of that, our soldiers have the opportunity to fire at least once or twice every month.

[Marek] Do you also practice reflexive firing?

[Prokes] For the time being, the rules do not make it possible for us to do that. But if there should be a change, such practice should be interesting and useful.

SZDSZ Rejects Alliance With Horn-Led MSZP

LD1305161694 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 13 May 94

[Text] The Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] will not participate in the next government if the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] nominates Chairman Gyula Horn for prime minister. Campaign chief Balint Magyar told journalists that if the MSZP names the party chairman as candidate for prime minister, they will read the message that the Socialists do not want to form a coalition with the SZDSZ.

The party will accept only an alliance in which it can realize its program, SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Petoe said. He added that the final word on coalition membership will be pronounced by the extraordinary delegates' meeting of the SZDSZ a week after the second round of the elections.

Goncz Comments on Post-Election Situation

94CH0258A Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 27 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by Mihaly Bak: "Statement by Arpad Goncz in Encore"]

[Text] In his statement made to Hungarian Radio's "Encore," Arpad Goncz said yesterday that the responsibilities of the president of the Republic begin after the elections, when the new administration must be set up. The president said that he must meet with every powerful political faction, assessing the balance of power and determining which could be part of a coalition that is capable of governing. Arpad Goncz said that the results of Hungary's elections must be respected.

The president said that the parties have already said every conceivable bad thing about each other and everything conceivable good thing about themselves; a kind of flirtation dance is going on to determine who could form alliances with whom. These attempts must be accepted at face value, said Goncz, who thinks that, contrary to 1990, today we are familiar with the parties. The president's recommendation to the voters is that everyone start from the present situation. Senseless slander will come back to haunt those who engage in it, the president stated.

What the president sees throughout the country is that people would like to live a life without fear and to see unblemished public service. It is the citizens' responsibility not to vote for those who are to be feared or those who fail to serve the community well. The advancement of unblemished public service will most likely be the responsibility of the next parliament.

There are two models in Europe. Despite its economic accomplishments, the Italian model is dangerous; on the other hand, the Austrian or Finnish model is a splendid example of reconciliation of interests, Arpad Goncz said. The latter is slower but leads to more stable results. No permanent party system will develop before 1998 in Hungary, the president continued, although people subscribe to three value systems: They want national-Christian traditions, freedom, and equality. There will only be a change of administrations, not a change of regimes. Goncz said that opinions of Hungary abroad have deteriorated during the past year; the West has become frightened of the conditions in the region, and has also become frightened of certain statements and anti-Semitic voices.

Everyone should vote and follow his or her conscience, Arpad Goncz said. He hopes that none of the parties will try at the last moment to forcibly influence voters—not even by merely stirring emotions. But he could not promise that such occurrences would not happen.

ΩPro-Government Media Attack Horn's Past

94P20740A

[Editorial Report] On the eve of the 8 May parliamentary election, media supporting the present right-of-center government gave unprecedented publicity to charges that Gyula Horn, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)—successor to the former ruling Communist Party's reformist wing—took part in the violent suppression of the 1956 anti-communist revolution. On 25 April the daily PESTI HIRLAP reported that Andras Bencsik, the paper's chief editor and a parliamentary candidate of the present governing coalition's main party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), said at a political rally in Budapest that Horn is "certainly a criminal and possibly a murderer." Although "it may not be possible to prove" that Horn committed a specific crime, Bencsik said, "he was a member of an armed organization that is smeared with blood"—evidently referring to rumors, which Horn has not denied, that as a young Communist in 1956 he was active in an armed militia that fought against the revolutionaries.

On 30 April PESTI HIRLAP also ran excerpts from an interview that appeared on the television program "Panorama" in which Imre Kaldiko, a 1956 revolutionary, charged that in the hospital where he was kept prisoner after being wounded during the fighting, Horn "kicked him in the mouth twice," doing permanent damage. He recognized Horn's photograph after Horn became a prominent politician in the Kadar regime, Kaldiko claimed.

The other main pro-government daily, UJ MAGYARORSZAG, reported on 30 April that the Horn issue had come up at the MDF's weekly news conference the day before. At the news conference Interior Ministry State Secretary Fabian Jozsa speculated that the reason that the MSZP did not name its chairman, Horn, as its prime ministerial candidate—the MSZP was the only major party to go into the election without naming its nominee for prime minister—was that the MSZP was "prepared for the attacks" against Horn's "political past."

Rumors about Horn's 1956 activities started surfacing a few years ago but did not get much publicity even after a letter demanding an investigation of his past appeared in the 2 September 1991 UJ MAGYARORSZAG, which has a relatively small circulation. The letter quoted from the January 1990 issue of the prominent monthly

MOZGO VILAG—published while the Communists were still in power—according to which Robert Ribanszki, secretary of the official Patriotic People's Front under the Kadar regime, allegedly declared that Horn had been "merciless" in fighting the revolutionaries. "Gyula was relentless. He slashed and shot like a madman," Ribanszki reportedly said.

Although the MSZP denounced Bencsik's charges as "going beyond all normal and acceptable limits" and demanded that the MDF withdraw Bencsik's candidacy for parliament (NEPSZABADSAG 26 Apr 94), Horn announced that he would not sue for libel because he "trusted in public opinion to condemn" Bencsik for making the allegations (NEPSZABADSAG 27 Apr 94). Horn also attacked the "Panorama" television program for airing the charges against him, declaring that he had "never been" to any prison hospital or even the town where the alleged events occurred. Denouncing the program for publicizing "gross lies that hurt my human dignity without giving me a chance to answer," Horn said that the public service media were guilty of "unprecedented . . . abuses" during the election campaign (MAGYAR HIRLAP 2 May 94).

In their denunciations and denials, the MSZP did not say what the actual charges against Horn were, thus limiting further publicity. Similarly, while NEPSZABADSAG, which calls itself a "socialist daily," and MAGYAR HIRLAP, a paper with a liberal orientation, published the MSZP's statements, they did not detail the allegations against Horn and thus refrained from publicizing the charges against him.

Political Scientist Views 'Political Elite'

94CH0258B Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 28 Apr 94 p 19

[Interview with political scientist Istvan Schlett by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Schlett Says: The Political Elite Will Solve Any Conflict"]

[Text] The intelligentsia constantly clobbers the politicians. You journalists do that also, even though the political elite's demonstrated ability to solve problems could serve as an example for other elites, e.g., the cultural elite, said political scientist Istvan Schlett. The renowned expert said that, on the basis of the past four years, we can assume that, regardless of the outcome of the elections, the parties will be able to solve the problem of setting up an administration and of governing.

You are telling me to imagine the unimaginable: Gabor Kuncze and Peter Boross sitting at the same table and discussing the possibility of forming a coalition. Well, that too could happen. The Hungarian political elite is cultured enough to be able to solve a deadlock, Schlett continued.

[Schlett] I do not think parliament will have to be dissolved and new elections called because of the leading parties' inability to agree on the conditions for governing. The fact that the Free Democrats' nominee for the post of prime minister is not a person with a "bunker mentality," but one who represents a more open aspect of the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], is an indication of their willingness to compromise. The Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] has also gotten rid of those whose main objective was to create conflicts.

I think that the parties are ready for further changes in their leadership. Of course, I cannot see what is inside the heads of politicians, and the opposite of this is also conceivable. At any rate, it can be said on the basis of recent events that they are more intelligent than is generally assumed.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] You are reluctant to make a guess about which parties are likely to become coalition partners. I will rephrase the question, therefore, by asking which parties are likely to win seats in parliament?

[Schlett] Forecasts suggest that the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] will win the elections. However, no one indeed can say which party will come in second and third. The number of undecided people is relatively great and it remains to be seen whom they will vote for. This in itself may be cause for surprises at the elections.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] What if parties of diametrically opposing ideals get most of the votes, e.g. the MDF, the MSZP, and the SZDSZ? Can you imagine them sitting at the same table and beginning talks on governing? The statements they have made so far exclude any possibility of a consensus between them. Do they not lose their credibility before the voters by their willingness to accept any deal for gaining power?

[Schlett] You approach the issue from the wrong direction. Credibility is indeed important in politics but the capacity to solve problems is even more important. It is natural for parties to compete against each other during an election campaign, for they are fighting for votes. However, finding compromises becomes a priority after the elections because the country's governability is at stake. Politics has a much more extensive arsenal than merely classifying parties on the basis of their credibility or lack thereof or of whether or not they fulfill their campaign promises. The citizens expect politicians to solve conflicts. In the interest of society, of our country, of joining Europe and, of course, in the self-interest of parties and politicians, they must adapt their viewpoints to one another. Of course, the voters will determine the possible combinations for a coalition, but I do not believe that a situation will arise where the politicians will fail to find a viable solution.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Is it possible that the situation will change between the two rounds?

[Schlett] Of course. It could happen that the winner of the first round will increase its advantage, for people do not like to vote for a losing party. But the opposite could also happen, namely, that a party will gain such a landslide victory that people will become scared and say: This is too much of a victory. Perhaps several parties will form totally unexpected alliances to hinder an absolute victory by a leading party.

Coal Miners End Strike, Sign Accord

LD1205190794 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1730 GMT 12 May 94

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[Excerpt] Hard coal miners have ended their two-week strike. This was possible thanks to an accord between the trade unionists and the chairmen of the coal companies. In a number of cities, Solidarity organized strikes and demonstrations. This is a part of the protest action the continuation of which was decided upon yesterday by the National Commission. The action is to continue until the time that the government undertakes bilateral talks with Solidarity on the subject of national postulates.

[Unidentified correspondent] The miners will not receive pay for the period of the strike. In the course of talks during the night, the protestors agreed to work off the strike days during time normally off work. They can also include the strike days as part of their holidays or take them as unpaid leave. Before the miners receive payments for the days worked off, they will be able to apply for advances. Now they are awaiting the implementation of the decisions adopted.

[Begin recording by miners Solidarity official Karol Luzniak, identified by caption] Eleven postulates out of 12 were settled or agreed upon yesterday and set down on paper, which does not mean that they are implemented yet. Here, miners will surely be awaiting on an immediate basis a report on what is taking place during the meetings of the teams that have been created. [end recording]

[Correspondent] Production has recommenced at the hard coal mines, starting from the second shift today. The miners also ended their occupation of the State Hard Coal Agency in Katowice. [passage omitted]

Minister Pol Supports Agreements

LD1305112494 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0940 GMT 13 May 94

[Text] Warsaw, 13 May (PAP)—The government will definitely adhere to agreements concluded with hard coal and lignite-mine workers, said Trade and Industry Minister Marek Pol, while delivering a government report on the strike situation and the results of negotiations with trade unions in the Sejm today.

"There has not been a single day without strike since this government took office. Most strikes do not meet the requirements of legality, but we recognize this method of protest. Strikes are always dangerous. This one, however, was particularly dangerous because it affected strategic sectors, crucial to the security of the state. We are aware that trade unions are not rich, but, all over the world, financial compensation for strikes is paid by the organizer," Minister Pol said.

According to Pol, the strikes in the lignite-mining industry were caused by anxiety over the sector's restructuring. The protest in the hard coal mining industry was initially linked to support for lignite-mine workers and later became a manifestation of support for Solidarity's demands on the national scale.

Pol believes that mine workers should elect their representation; there are from several to a dozen or so trade union organizations in each colliery. For example, in the hard coal mining industry, there are 39 trade union organizations.

The minister briefed the deputies on the content of agreements concluded with lignite-mine workers on 30 April in Konin and with hard-coal mine workers on 11 May in Warsaw.

Implications of Strike Campaign

PM1305101494 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 6 May 94 p 4

[Article by Marek F. Klimek: "Dangerous Union; Marian Krzaklewski Says: I Know People Take Part in Strikes...."]

[Text] "Really, you do not need to persuade people too hard to get them to strike," Piotr Zak, Solidarity National Commission spokesman, insists. "The authorities refuse to recognize the truth that social discontent does exist in real life and is not something our union has conjured up."

For two weeks now, strike action organized by the NSZZ [Independent and Self-Financing Trade Union] Solidarity has been carried out on a nationwide scale. To date, no other major central union (except for Kontra, which, as its very name suggests, can probably be expected to endorse all protest actions) has come out in support.

"Society Will Pay"

"We are definitely against strikes because their political objectives are hard to conceal. Solidarity leadership has launched yet another attempt to impose its political will on enterprise work forces on the pretext of defending their interests, but, in fact, it is society that will pay for the present strikes—and not for the first time, either," the Mining Industry's Trade Unions Confederation, which groups all of the major miners' unions outside Solidarity, declares in an official announcement. "I know that people are taking part in strikes," Solidarity chairman Marian Krzaklewski attempts to explain. "It must be that there is not sufficient control between the central union administration and union members here."

Solidarity, led by Krzaklewski, has put all of its money on one horse in organizing the nationwide strike action. Chairman Krzaklewski has been touring the country attempting to incite people to strike or to fan the flames of those strikes that have already been started. It seems, however, that his efforts are not particularly effective.

Whereas on the first day the strike organizers were successful in stopping the work of more than 1,000 enterprises, the second day brought only half that number, and, during the following days, only a dozen or so work places were still going on with the protest action.

The number of striking coal mines has also remained constant. They are for the most part quite weak enterprises, some of which are even destined to be liquidated. Despite vigorous attempts by the Solidarity Silesia-Dabrowa Regional Board, coal mines belonging to the most powerful Katowice Coal Holding concern have resisted invitations to join the strike and stop production. Yesterday's attempts to start a railroad strike proved that people nowadays are beginning to think of the consequences before stopping work.

In many enterprises, the strike is carried out in a purely symbolic manner. For example, at the Defuma plant in Dabrowa Gornicza, which is the only enterprise in Silesia apart from the coal mines to have joined the strike, the protest action lasted all of two hours, while the organizers cheerfully declared that they would soon make up for the stoppage. At the Czeczott coal mine, all 22 strikers—that is, less than 1 percent of the crew working the first shift—gathered at the mine's Solidarity headquarters and, after assessing the situation, returned promptly to work. At the Piast coal mine, the strike was limited to the mechanical coal-processing plant, which nevertheless stopped the work of the whole mine because the coal extracted underground was not taken up to the surface.

Will We Have Another Panama?

The demands announced by Solidarity cannot be met quickly, and some of them are even impossible to implement in practical terms. For example, Chairman Krzaklewski interprets the demand to "enfranchise all society" as follows: "The government oligarchy intends to share the privatized enterprises among themselves. We will have a similar situation to the one they had in Panama, where 20,000 people took over 70 percent of the national assets. But, if you hang on to your privatization bonds and pool them, you will be able to outbid any red capitalist!" That was a fragment of Krzaklewski's rousing address to the striking miners at the Jastrzebie coal mine, who greeted it with tumultuous applause.

"Now we can appreciate the importance of studying psychology and sociology in relation to the sphere of ownership transformations, and the significance of cooperation between specialists in these fields and experts in economic restructuring," Industry and Trade Minister Marek Pol remarked after signing the agreement that led to the miners' ending their 10-day strike.

"The government has been familiar with the union's demands for a long time," Piotr Zak insists, "at the very least since the end of the experts' talks on 26 March, when eight demands were officially recorded at the Council of Ministers Office [URM] and entered, neatly and perfectly legibly, into the URM computer. I personally checked it as it was being done. I believe that ministers have had more than enough time to acquaint themselves with the document."

Zak's own declarations can dispel anyone's illusions about Solidarity's long-term aims. "I was amused to hear Minister Miller claim that parliament is working on a pact. A similar situation in the recent past led, among other things, to the collapse of Hanna Suchocka's government, and now another government, which has been in office for seven months already, claims that it needs still more time."

To Regain Lost Positions

The union's decisionmakers, who still remember the old left-wing government's traditional inclination to be severe and tough in its treatment of strikes and strikers, are trying to recapture the remains of the ethos of the great strike wave of the 1980's and thereby regain their positions as public leaders.

After all, on the other side of the barricades, they no longer have a poor but honest government hailing from the "polystyrene" era [reference to striking shipyard workers sleeping on blocks of polystyrene during the Gdansk shipyard occupation in 1980], but the much-hated postcommunists, who batten on the working men's misery. It is true that they were elected in a democratic process, but they still represent the last chance for Solidarity as the latter continues to lose its membership and its influence because, if Solidarity fails to successfully "galvanize" the country against the present government team, the ones that follow it will easily withstand every future protest action.

Foreign Minister Outlines Policy Directions

LD1205180394 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0856 GMT 12 May 94

[Text] Warsaw, 12 May—Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski presented the main directions and principles of Poland's activity in the international arena in the Sejm today. Here are the most important themes of the speech:

The treaty with the Republic of Lithuania signed by President Lech Walesa closed a fundamental stage of Polish foreign policy devoted to establishing the foundations for partnership relations with neighbors and to defining the strategic goals of the foreign policy of the sovereign Polish Republic. We can be satisfied with the results achieved. There are no foreign troops in Poland—a rare fact in the history of the past 300 years. We are the only country under transformation that has concluded treaties on good-neighborly cooperation with all of our neighbors. (...)

Poland is also a country of agreement between all serious political forces and in public opinion on the basic goals of foreign policy. We owe appreciation to the authors of

these important achievements, in particular to my predecessor, Professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski. We are building our place in the world on the solid foundations created by them.

It is worth recalling the guiding principles of our foreign policy. The efforts of our diplomacy focus on activities serving people and the good of individuals. There is clarity in the policy and of the concrete actions taken within its framework. The government has no monopoly on activity abroad, and neither has the state. (All centers of power—the president, the government, and parliament—take part in its creation and implementation. The openness of our state and society makes politicians, self-government activists, and ordinary citizens participate every day in this activity.)

The policy, determined in a normal democratic process—that is, with the participation of the parties—is implemented in a supraparty manner (we require diplomats to represent the state and its goals and not give party interests or personal views). Foreign policy, as any other, has to be coherent (it means, among other things, the need for close coordination of actions by various state bodies and institutions). Our policy strictly observes modern international standards, in particular the respect for identity, aspirations, and views of other states. We are conducting a friendly policy, well-disposed to everybody who does the same.

The most important task of our foreign policy is to ensure lasting security for Poland. We are doing so by developing good relations with all of our neighbors and by rapprochement with Euro- Atlantic security structures.

Every day we are hosting in Poland, legally and illegally, hundreds of thousands of Russian, Ukrainian, and other seasonal workers, tradesmen, and tourists. They argue with Poles about wages, prices, and the quality of goods. Despite such great movements of people, we have not noted any incidents aimed at Russia. Miracle? Yes, it is a miracle of normality. I am convinced that, at the basis of this peaceful atmosphere in human relations, there is a feeling among Poles that now they are hosts in their own country, and, as such, they are able to welcome all guests, including those who only recently symbolized imperial violence and dictatorship. (...)

By increasing contacts and proposals of joint practical actions, we are telling all of our neighbors: We are ready to become friends, we are aiming at being related by a net of agreements and projects that will ensure the free movement of people, information, goods, services, and capital. (...)

Poland and Germany are good neighbors. We are looking with confidence at democratic and European Germany. This good-neighborliness should transform into a friendship. A firm friendship is still the aim. If we are to have any mission, this should be i. because friendship between Poles and Germans will mean that an important source of potential conflict in Europe will be eliminated. This is a course worth pursuing.

We see the path to friendship in uniting Poles and Germans in the same commonwealth of nations, in the European Union [EU], and in making us partners in joint projects, similar to French-German reconciliation. This aim dominates our political dialogue. A particular form of this is the Paris-Bonn-Warsaw cooperation, the so-called Weimar triangle. We are placing a great deal of importance in developing this cooperation by intensification of a dialogue, as well as by its broadening and move from diplomacy to parliament and into sector problems and, finally, to local and civil projects. Regional and transborder cooperation, as well as German investors' interest in all Poland's regions, are very important.

We attach great importance to military cooperation, and we will strive to expand it. Taking care of Polish citizens and citizens of Polish origin living in Germany and the German minority living in Poland is the topic of our constant attention.

The neighborly, friendly relations with the Czechs, the Slovaks, and the Hungarians are developing very well. The agreement on free trade—CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Association]—is the greatest joint achievement. We believe the weakening of the Visegrad Group to be unfavorable. It stimulates a search for different ties in Central Europe. We are not happy about it because we cannot find a better solution than the Visegrad Group. It includes the states that have been the leaders among the postcommunist countries of political and economic reforms and that unequivocally support integration with the EU and NATO.

Relations with eastern neighbors have been less developed. They are too weak, and our important task is to raise them to the level achieved with other neighbors. (...)

In this context, relations with Russia are of the utmost importance. We have different views on ways of achieving European security. This difference, however, should not exclude lively bilateral and regional cooperation.

Within the program of joint Polish-Russian undertakings this year, we are going to conclude a trade protocol for 1994 and, possibly, for the following years. We will start work on an agreement on economic cooperation that, among other things, will define the principles and directions for developing cooperation links. We will expand transborder cooperation. We will review and specify the possibilities for financial and banking cooperation. We will undertake work on the setting up of a supragovernmental foundation for supporting democracy and market reforms in Central and East Europe, activities that will compensate for shortcomings in the sphere of information and expand the Polish-Russian dialogue to various political issues. We will try to set up an association for preventing and combating organized

crime, including representatives of police, prosecutors, the judiciary of the states of the region, and Interpol.

In relations with Ukraine, we are striving to fill the formula of the "close" partnership with material content. In relations with Lithuania and Belarus and also with other eastern neighbors and countries further afield, such as Moldova and Kazakhstan, we concentrate our efforts on creating conditions conducive to economic cooperation. We are continuing our active participation in regional institutions, in particular in the Baltic initiative and the Central European initiative. We will contribute with our experience to work on the pact on stability with regard to the legal regulation of relations with neighbors and with national minorities.

We see two threats to the process of building good-neighborly relations, friendship, and regional cooperation. At the basis of this is intolerance and indisposition toward differences. Poland is treating all of its neighbors as fully independent and sovereign states.

The development of friendly bonds in our region can also be hampered by the intolerance of one of the nations. Unfortunately, we have noticed the symptoms of this in Russia. We are afraid of it. We have been alarmed by statements about Russia's "particular interests" and "special role" in neighboring countries. These are not conducive to the stability of the region and of Europe. We do not accept this.

The second threat, also having its source in intolerance, is nationalism. We can see what it has led to in the former Yugoslavia. (...)

Poland persistently supports the process of linking the East and the West into one whole. We want a practical implementation of the principle of indivisibility and security of the whole of Europe and, more widely, of the whole European area. We are of the opinion that the most direct road toward a Europe without divisions is an expansion of proven structures—the North Atlantic Treaty and the EU. This expansion does not mean the creation of new divisions but the breaking down of old ones. That is why we are striving resolutely for our membership in these organizations. That is why we support similar attempts by other states of the Visegrad Group and treat the membership of the group in the Atlantic structures as an important step, but also only aa the first step. That is why we support the establishment of close ties between NATO and Russia. The security of Poland and Europe would not be full and permanent if the ultimate system were not to include Russia and our eastern neighbors.

Our most important goal in 1994 is to create conditions for a speedy development of cooperation and the compatibility of the Polish defense system with the system of NATO. Our participation in the Partnership for Peace and a number of agreements on bilateral military cooperation serve this purpose. We have to maintain the momentum of joining the Partnership. The combination of our arguments about the advantages—for Poland and for Europe—of expanding NATO and of the realistic nature of our offer within the Partnership are yielding good results. Further results will depend on our diplomatic efforts and even more so on the military dimension of our relations with NATO. I want to stress here the full involvement of MON [Ministry of National Defense] and the exemplary cooperation of both our departments in the actions to date.

We will continue our efforts for NATO and WEU [Western European Union] membership. We are moving closer toward both these goals. In the case of NATO, we cannot count on any spectacular results for the moment, unless some dramatic—and potentially dangerous for us—events were to take place in Russia. Consequently, our task for today is to maintain the debate about what is happening. (...)

We attach special importance to the discussion with and in the United States. A very important occasion for continuing this discussion will be President Clinton's visit to Warsaw this July.

We welcome with satisfaction our associate WEU partnership. It constitutes the beginning of the road toward membership and the basis for involvement in the work and activities of the Union.

We are continuing our activity in the CSCE, where we are a significant member. We are particular about the full implementation by Poland and all partners of the agreements on reducing arms and military activities in Europe and about the clarity of these agreements. At the United Nations, we are concentrating on activities that serve the resolution of conflicts, the protection of human rights, and arms reductions and disarmament.

Our activities for security are encountering obstacles. On the one hand, there is the conservatism of Western institutions, a fear of opening up, and an unwillingness to take up the challenge connected with the election of new members and their integration. On the other, there is the conservatism of significant political circles in Russia that treat these institutions as a threat to Russian national interests. Regretfully, today such statements as Minister Kozyrev's last year, that Russia "sees the NATO countries as natural friends and in the future as allies," are rare.

The second fundamental foreign policy task is to ensure the best possible conditions for permanent development of our country in its entire economic and civilizational spectrum. Since 1989, we have consistently been seeking these conditions in integration with the European Communities. (...)

Just like then, we also can find no better possibilities today for ensuring development conditions for Poland than participation in the EU. (...)

Our future membership is accepted by the Union. An expression of this is the association treaty and the declaration of the Copenhagen summit.

Poland must proceed toward the EU consistently and quickly. Remaining outside it would mean being a politically marginalized country that is economically discriminated against and forced to submit to decisions made by others. This choice has no alternative: Such are the realities of today's and the future Europe. The most important task in 1994 is to determine as specifically as possible the road toward Poland's EU membership. We are making efforts for an undertaking from the Union on Poland's acceptance that would be more binding than the Copenhagen declaration. An important opportunity to obtain this undertaking will be during the German presidency of the Union, which is very well disposed toward our demands.

We are striving to initiate joint work on a scenario for integrating Polish and European agriculture. (...)

We are also striving for further improvement in the access of goods and services to the Common Market, and we are counteracting signs of protectionism. We are looking for ways of joining in cooperation in areas covered by a joint EU policy—trade, transportation, energy, agriculture, environmental protection, finance, and so on. Finally, we are striving for increased aid for Poland within PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary], as well as from other community funds, and for earmarking a greater part of them than hitherto for investment purposes. (...)

The issue of European integration dominates our relations with the West European states. We are increasing the initiatives and diplomatic consultations involving them. The visit by French Prime Minister Balladur this July will be an important event. We will be convincing him that Poland's participation in the EU will be to its advantage and not a burden to it. We are intensifying dialogue with Great Britain, the third state in the European big three, on ways of political integration, of which that country is a convinced advocate.

The visit by the president and the prime minister to Italy confirm the good relations with that country. We are looking for new possibilities of cooperation with the medium and smaller states of the EU—toward Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal. We are intensifying our action explaining our integration plans. With the Nordic countries, we are looking for ways to strengthen and utilize the promising prospects of dynamic development of the Baltic region, linked inter alia to its inclusion in the EU. In view of the approaching EU membership of the four EFTA [European Free Trade Association] states, reaching agreement with this group will be of great significance for our participation in European integration. We will strive for our trade relations with these states not to deteriorate. (...)

Already today we must translate what are still for many people abstract slogans about Poland's membership in the EU into specific information and undertakings. This task is urgent, given that the prospect of enlarging the Union is not at all distant. (...)

The greatest threat to the policy of integration is protectionism. This problem is still particularly important in agriculture. In the association treaty, there is a lack of strategic vision of integration in this sector, a lack of will to create a common market in this area. Integration must take many years here, however, and cannot take place without conflicts. Until protectionist resistance is overcome and a scenario for including Polish agriculture in the Community is created, the prospects of membership will be uncertain. I do not have to add that, from our side too, protectionist tendencies constitute a real and the most serious threat, apart from possible delays in the adaptation processes, to integration into the EU.

The United States, together with the EU, plays an important part in our efforts to ensure the best conditions for the development of our country. Traditionally, the Poles see the Americans, many of whom are of Polish origin, as friends who are sympathetic and ready to cooperate and help. This results in our deep belief in the need for a U.S. presence in Europe, for our frequent contacts and very intensive political dialogue—more lively than that with the European states—as well as for the rapidly growing U.S. investments in Poland. Our objective is to maintain this situation, our position as the main U.S. partner in Central and East Europe, as well as to obtain U.S. consent for our integration into NATO. We are making promising progress. In the economic field, we attach much importance to the program "of emerging large economic markets". We like its philosophy, which characterizes sensible investors: support for countries that manifest dynamic development and that have conditions for becoming regional driving forces and, consequently, important economic partners for the United States.

We are particular about the perfection of our multidimensional relations with the Holy See. An additional reason for this today is the fact that the Holy Father is the best disposed toward us foreign head of state. We must not forget this when debating the ratification of the concordat, because our relations will enter a difficult phase without it.

We are trying to broaden our circle of important economic partners. We are looking for them among East Asian and Middle East countries. (...)

This year's visits, President Walesa's to Japan and Prime Minister Pawlak's to China, will provide opportunities to present our plans and win over partners for them. We will extend our Partnership for Development initiative toward them, as well as toward other states that cooperate with us. Neither do we forget the developing states. They include many people who are very sympathetic to us. We maintain with them regular contacts that are commensurate with our interests and abilities.

We are participating in the work on UN reform. We maintain intense cooperation with the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. We have applied for OECD membership,

and we are trying to normalize the conditions of our GATT membership. We have joined the World Trade Organization created under the Uruguay Round. We have started work to ensure our participation in the organization that is to replace COCOM [Coordinating Committee on Export Controls].

We are intensifying international cooperation on environmental protection. This year we will sign appropriate agreements with Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Belarus, and Lithuania, and we will strengthen our presence in the Baltic region. Together with the Sejm commissions, we want to determine with greater precision the aims and means for the promotion of Polish culture so that it can facilitate the development of our country. We are seeking ways of linking international scientific exchange to the economy, without which its development would be constantly hindered by insufficient state resources.

Perhaps the greatest progress we have made is in the field of creating conditions for the free development of personal contacts. Today we can travel abroad without excessive formal impediments. However, this does not mean that travel is easy and that we are welcomed everywhere with open arms. Nor does it mean that our relatives, fellow countrymen who permanently live abroad, are well treated there and can visit us freely. We have to expand and civilize our border crossing points. (...)

The provision for our fellow countrymen of their rightful, proper, and safe conditions for cultivating their Polish provenance is more difficult. We attach much importance to this task. We consistently enforce the rights provided for under international norms and guaranteed under agreements. We will strive to protect Poles in Kazakhstan. We are continuing our activities that serve to cultivate the Polish language, traditions, and culture.

The most difficult task, however, is changing the Poles' and foreigners' stereotyped images, both positive and negative. Foreigners who are well disposed toward us see us as patriots ready for heroic deeds, as fervent Catholics, and as romantics. There is nothing in this image about enterprise, education, and present-day know-how. It is dominated by grave faces, with blood and horsemen in the background. Those who think ill of us see Poles as lazy workers, cantankerous politicians, corrupt bureaucrats, and fraudulent businessmen, and Poland as a country of dirt and mess. In fact, both images are grim. They do not encourage contacts. We have to change them, lighten them, show that Poland is a country of great opportunities and talented people. We have to promote Poles and Poland.

These are our three tasks—durable security, favorable conditions for development, and freedom of personal contacts—and the four greatest threats to them are intolerance, conservatism, protectionism, and stereotypes. These are the fundamental parameters of our foreign activity.

There is also a domestic dimension. Today it is perhaps the most important one. Rarely in its history has Poland had such a favorable situation and such good opportunities for development as now. It is very much up to us whether we are going to make use of these.

We are modernizing our foreign service. We want to eliminate the lack of separation between the fields of "politics" and "administration," which is no longer found in modern democracies. We will achieve this by separating out in the ministry the minister's political servicing apparatus. (...)

The official apparatus at the ministry will be headed by a general secretary assisted by his deputies. The officials' duties and powers, the criteria for their selection, subordination, and promotion, will be defined by an act. I have already sent the bill for interdepartmental consultation. (...)

Second, we would like to introduce a number of solutions strengthening the coordination of foreign policy.

ΩLocal Government Elections Scheduled

94P20693A

[Editorial Report] On 18 April, despite President Walesa's decision to veto a new electoral law for local governments, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak announced that new local elections would be held on 19 June. As a result of Walesa's veto, these elections will be conducted according to the existing electoral law, dated June 1990 and updated with special provisions for the city of Warsaw passed earlier this year. (Polonia TV Network, 18 Apr 94)

The most important difference between the current electoral system and the vetoed alternative is the threshold at which proportional representation applies. According to the current law, election by simple majority applies in gminas (municipalities, the smallest administrative units) of up to 40,000 residents and proportional representation in those over 40,000. The proposal approved by the Sejm but rejected by Walesa would have lowered the cutoff to gminas with 15,000 inhabitants. The president criticized the new law as "an attempt by the governing coalition to politicize the elections by putting its own people into the local governments." Walesa also expressed dissatisfaction with a provision that "forbids conducting campaigns in churches," arguing that "separation of church and state is a political fact that the church fully respects. There is no need to emphasize this any further." The presidential statement met with strong support from the secretary of Episcopate Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, who "was very pleased with the presidential veto." (GAZETA WYBORCZA 13 Apr 94)

Depending on the gmina's population, between 15 and 100 council members will be elected in single- or multiple-seat districts in the following manner: 15 council members in gminas with fewer than 4,000 inhabitants; 18 in gminas with 4,000-7,000 inhabitants; 20 in gminas with 7,000-10,000 inhabitants; 24 in gminas with 10,000-20,000 inhabitants; 28 in gminas with 20,000-40,000 inhabitants; 30 in gminas with 40,000-60,000 inhabitants; 36 in gminas with 60,000-80,000 inhabitants; 40 in gminas with 80,000-100,000 inhabitants; and up to 100 members to those gminas (exclusively in Warsaw, which is divided into several gminas) with more than 1 million inhabitants. ("Panorama" newscast, Second TV Network 18 Apr 94)

The deadline for submitting the names of candidates for the local councils is 20 May. Candidates in single-seat voting districts are required to provide petitions with at least 15 signatures supporting their nomination; petitions with 150 signatures are needed for candidate lists in multiseat districts." Residents of Warsaw will vote according to the new "law on the administration system of the capital city of Warsaw," which divides the city into several gminas. ("Panorama" newscast, Second TV Network 18 Apr 94)

Background of Right-Wing 'Polish Union' Examined

WS1205125094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 12 May 94 p 3

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski: "Five Extraparliamentary Groupings Will Form a Confederation Today; Flirting With the Right"]

[Text] The Conservative Party [PK], Center Accord [PC], Movement for the Republic [RdR], and Christian-National Union [ZChN] will become the Polish Union confederation on Thursday [12 May]. They intend to run jointly in the self-governmental elections and then in the parliamentary elections; they also want to back the same candidate for president.

There is more to the confederation than the forms of cooperation among these parties so far; however, it is less than their leaders declared immediately after the last elections. At that time, they were speaking about the necessity of uniting quickly.

What There Has Been: Partings and Comebacks

Before the parliamentary elections in 1991, for the PC, which was quite a significant party, the ZChN was a minor little party full of phobias. Jaroslaw Kaczynski was trying to build up the image of his party as a proreform, center grouping, as a modern Christian democracy. The PC considered the ZChN to be extremely rightist, a traditional grouping that, conscious of its own weakness, wanted to enter the parliament by gaining the support of the church and by concealing itself behind the slogan of WAK (Electoral Catholic Action).

After the elections, this ceased to bother Kaczynski—it turned out that the ZChN would have a considerable club in the parliament.

Both parties survived several months in a joint coalition supporting the Olszewski government; they defended it with determination. Then they unanimously turned against the "recommunist government of Pawlaks and Wachowskis" (this is what the Pawlak Cabinet was called by the participants of the PC congress, which was being held at the time).

At that time: The RdR is formed within the PC and leaves the grouping (the RdR is the third participant of the confederation that is being formed today). Relations between both parties are not very good, largely because of the circumstances under which the RdR was formed—as a result of a split within the PC. Apart from that, Jaroslaw Kaczynski and Jan Olszewski were already not really fond of each other at that time.

The Suchocka government is formed. At night, during negotiations on the establishment of this cabinet, the center-rightist "five" splits. The PC leaves the conference room, the other groupings remain (the ZChN; Peasant Accord; the Party of Christian Democrats, PChD; and even the closest ally of the PC at the time, the Peasant-Christian Party, the SLCh). This is a defeat for Kaczynski's prestige.

The ZChN, in coalition with the Democratic Union [UD] and the liberals, goes through a stage of "civilizing." The ministers of the party of Wieslaw Chrzanowski cooperate quite well with the ministers of UD and the Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD]. UD, the KLD, and the ZChN become so accustomed to one another that, after the downfall of the government, there are politicians who mention the possibility of forming a joint coalition in the September 1993 parliamentary elections.

In the meantime, the PC also goes through a period of transformation, but in an entirely different direction. It does not decide to become a "constructive" opposition to the Suchocka cabinet. In the parliament, the PC is alone; being jointly in the opposition does not cause Olszewski and Kaczynski to join forces. Olszewski on his side and Kaczynski on his gather smaller, very radical rightist groupings around them.

From the fall of 1992 to the spring of 1993, a number of cooperation declarations are signed, and coalitions for Poland are established. These are the times of the "June Left," of rightist politicians' touring Poland.

The PC expresses sharp criticism of the Suchocka government and the ZChN. Politicians of the ZChN retaliate and make ironic remarks concerning Kaczynski's party.

The Suchocka government, not long before its downfall, is left by the PL—the fourth grouping making up the confederation today (it proved disloyal to the ZChN, with which it was an ally at the time).

Within the Suchocka government is Aleksander Hall's PK. After the elections in September 1993, it is left by Kazimierz Michal Ujazdowski and his supporters; they form the Conservative Coalition [KK] (the last party of the "five" that make up the confederation today).

Before the 1993 elections, differences between the PC and the ZChN are so great that no one, aside from a few politicians, even mentions the possibility of a joint election campaign. The roles change. Now the ZChN is a serious, proreform, civilized grouping, whereas the PC is a small, "leader-oriented" party of Jaroslaw Kaczynski, driven by internal conflicts.

The ZChN runs in the elections as the "Fatherland" coalition, along with the "rightist" component of the Suchocka cabinet: Hall's PK, the PChD, and the SLCh; the PC runs alone, just like the PL and the RdR.

In the ensuing postelection shock, politicians of the rightist groupings began to admit their mistakes and to announce unification soon.

What There Is: A Confederation

The confederation means not only less than unification but even less than a federation. The five groupings will not have a common leader. The constituent parties will maintain their organizational identities. However, a council will be established that will be an authority superior to the authorities of the individual parties.

What stands in the way to unification of the five parties, aside from their past? The parties do not want to give up their identities. Each of them (this applies particularly to the ZChN, however) believes that, as an independent party and by maintaining its own structure, it may mean more than as a party unified with other groupings).

Rightist politicians say that the greatest drawback of their part of the political scene is not the large number of parties but the existence, in almost each of them, of internal divisions. Right now, they can be seen most easily in the ZChN, but they also exist in the PL. The party that is most uniform today is the PC.

Characteristic of the rightist part of the political scene are great ambitions of the leaders of the groupings; in addition, those leaders often do not really like each other. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which Kaczynski, Chrzanowski, Szeremietiew, and Janowski are supposed to decide which one person will be the leader of the joint grouping.

Among those five groupings, there are real programmatic differences. It would be difficult to reconcile the definitely negative attitude toward trade unions, presented by Michal Ujazdowski's KK (in the previous Sejm, Ujazdowski was one of the initiators of the bill on limiting the role of trade unions) with the stand of the PL (which has its origins in the Individual Farmers' Solidarity) as well as the sentimental approach to Solidarity that is taken by Kaczynski, Szeremietiew, and Chrzanowski.

It would also be difficult to reconcile the PL's conviction about the need for broad state intervention in the economy, with the liberal approach of the KK.

Apart from that, the parties also differ, among other things, in their attitude toward integration with Europe: the pro-European approach of the PC and the KK is confronted with the approach of the ZChN, which may be called "Euro-skeptical."

If unification talks were actually held, the parties of the "five," especially the PC and the ZChN, would certainly quarrel if they were to verify the real strength of both parties in regions. This would be closely connected to the distribution of influence in the authorities and on the election lists of the common party.

An issue that would have to be resolved if unification were to actually take place would also be the definition of the attitude toward the one-person rightist force that is represented by Jan Olszewski. Even though the former prime minister is now the honorary president of the RdR (not Szeremietiew's RdR), he is not really taking part in the political life of the right wing. His political activities boil down to meetings with his supporters in church halls, cultural centers, etc. He is advocating the model of concentrating the rightist groupings with Solidarity. At his most recent meeting on 9 May in the lower church of St. Andrew Bobola, he received the greatest applause when he spoke about Walesa and said good things about Solidarity.

What Will There Be?

Rightist politicians are afraid of establishing too quickly something that might break apart with a thump, which would finally compromise the right wing. Apart from that, unification carried out too quickly and forcefully might dissatisfy some of the parties' members.

In reply to the accusation that the confederation is a form that is supposed to replace real unification, the rightist politicians say that they are implementing the plan that was agreed upon early this year: first a confederation, then a federation.

Activists of the ZChN and the PC no longer say today that the final purpose of the process of "unification" is real unification. "It may be one party, but it does not have to be"; we hear both in the PC—that is, in a party that seemed to be all for unification, and in the ZChN, a party that most opposed the idea.

TV Council Decides on Party Access to Programs

WS1305102794 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 13 May 94 p 2

[Article by B.M.: "KRRiT Resolution; 45 Minutes for Political Parties"]

[Text] Yesterday, after five months' work, the National Council of Radio and Television [KRRiT] adopted a resolution on access of political parties to public radio and television. A decision on access of state organs to Polish Television will be made by KRRiT this morning.

Every week the most numerous political parties will be able to present themselves on Polish Television in a program that will be prepared jointly by television journalists and the parties' representatives. According to unofficial information that we learned from KRRiT, Polish Television President Wieslaw Walendziak is not really delighted with this solution; he believes, however, that this kind of the parties' "windows," in the form of a magazine program, will make it easier for political parties to get access to television. Cooperation in the creation of a model of such a program was declared by KRRiT, which is going to invite the parties and the public broadcaster to work out a set of rules for the appearances of the parties on television.

Along with the resolution, KRRiT prepared a statement in which it draws attention to the general mannerism of broadcasters, who violate the integrity of statements by shortening them or by lowering the volume of the voices of politicians who are talking with journalists. According to KRRiT, it is proof of nonprofessionalism, which is not found in the West. Some KRRiT members note that people are presented with the danger of the council's censorship, whereas the worst type of censorship is employed by journalists, who cut out two out of four spoken sentences as they wish.

The KRRiT statement also mentions a dangerous blurring of responsibility: The Polish Television president, the head of the Television Information Agency (there is an autonomy in information programs), and the directors of the individual programs are not really responsible for mistakes in information programs. The most important decisions here are made by the editor of a particular program, who is often only an associate member of television. It is necessary to make this responsibility clear, says the KRRiT statement.

Reprivatization Draft Laws, Dilemmas Viewed

WS1205133094 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 12 May 94 p 23

[Article by Czeslaw Rychlewski: "Reprivatization—Difficult Comebacks"]

[Text] *Every government of the Third Polish Republic avoided implementing reprivatization by saying it had other, more important issues with which to deal. Naturally, there was just one reason: They wanted to prevent stirring up social moods against the backdrop of possible conflicts between the former owners and the new users, and also given the issue of burdens on the budget.*

A draft reprivatization law prepared by the Ownership Transformations Ministry headed by Janusz Lewandowski, in cooperation with the Consultative Council for Reprivatization, was the one that was the most likely candidate for being submitted to a vote in the Sejm. Council Chairman Krzysztof Laszkiewicz says: "A year ago, we reached a consensus. The draft law was designed in a way that would prevent placing a burden on the budget and that would prevent taking anything out of anybody's pocket. Out of its 80 provisions, as many as 19 related to the protection of third parties, which means they were intended to prevent possible conflicts. Besides, the law treated all former owners in the same way."

Chances and Nuances

The draft law, the final stages of which were interrupted by the parliament's dissolution, provided for three forms of returning property that had been nationalized in the period of the Polish People's Republic [PRL]: return of property in its natural form, return in the form of substitute property, and return in the form of reprivatization coupons for which one could acquire shares in companies subject to privatization, as well as immovable property owned by the State Treasury, such as apartments.

So former owners faced the prospect of regaining as much of the property that had been taken away by the PRL as possible. Both those who were deprived of property in violation of the law in effect in the PRL and those who fell victim to legally implemented nationalization measures were supposed to be treated on equal footing. So it is no wonder that, when Suchocka's government was heading for a fall, the Union of Real Politics approached the reprivatization issue as a bargaining chip in the no-confidence vote. The party's offer—to support the government in return for a speedy vote on the reprivatization law—was rejected, and rumor has it that the offer did not even reach all those concerned (a certain moral authority, Lech Prochno-Wroblewski says, assured that the law was blocked).

The law in this shape and form, which is satisfactory to former owners, raised the doubts of both politicians and the public. The Catholic right wing raised the point that the property had often been acquired in a manner that could not be described as completely honest. The left wing, on the other hand, was trying to use the argument that, after several decades, workers have a right to regard themselves as owners of the enterprises in which they had invested their labor. Journalists reminded everyone that, in the PRL period, losses were suffered not just by owners of factories or of real estate holdings, but also by many ordinary citizens who were illegally arrested, deprived of educational opportunities, or denied passports, just to name a few injustices. If all of them decided

to demand that the Third Republic compensate them for losses suffered, the state's finances would face the danger of disaster.

Members of the Consultative Council for Reprivatization, however, argued that a return of property to its owners is the simplest form of reinstating a capitalist ownership structure that would not be excessively expensive for the state. Returning property in its natural form would apply mainly to small enterprises that currently are often being neglected or that have been devastated. The return of the owners was supposed to reinstate economic efficiency to enterprises. It was also argued that the same type of outcome should result from taking over substitution property, of which there is plenty in Poland and for which no owner can be found in many cases, even for a symbolic 1 zloty. Opponents, on the other hand, argued that there are no such guarantees because the former owners currently have no money, which means that they have no resources with which to invest, while possible heirs often have no idea of business dealings. Examples of enterprises going bankrupt shortly after their former owners were reinstated were cited.

A Change of Course

The draft law, which had not seen a vote because of the parliament's dissolution, returned to the Second Term Sejm in a slightly modified version and as an initiative coming from 79 Sejm deputies. Members of associations grouping former owners say they had had reason to believe that the government would support this version of the law. But what really happened was that there occurred a change of course a month ago. As a result, according to Tadeusz Koss, a spokesman for the president of the Polish Union of Real Estate Owners, the current worker/peasant government legitimized the nationalization that another worker/peasant government had implemented before.

The decision to prepare a governmental draft law was made at a session of the Council of Ministers in April. The chief of the Ownership Transformations Ministry was given just a few weeks in which to come up with the draft. It is known right now that the draft differs substantially from the Sejm deputies' draft, to the disadvantage of former owners.

First of all, claims are to be limited to cases of violation of the legal system in effect in the PRL in the 1944-58 period. The draft provides for reimbursement in the form of reprivatization coupons, but not up to the full amount of the value of the property concerned. Only owners of illegally nationalized property worth up to 1 billion zlotys would receive their equivalents in the form of coupons. With regard to the remaining owners, a regression scale will be applied. The possibility of returning some property in its natural form, which was suggested during last week's session of the Council of Ministers' Economic Committee, has not been settled yet. This would apply first of all to small enterprises loosely tied to the agricultural sector.

According to Ownership Transformations Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek, the government, while working on the alternative draft, had to take into account the effects of the reprivatization law on the budget and also had to see to it that the legal provisions do not cause new grievances. Similar solutions, Kaczmarek stated, were adopted in other postsocialist countries, such as Hungary. Both draft laws will be debated by the Sejm in late May/early June. There is no doubt in the minds of the former owners that the governmental draft law will obtain a majority.

The State as the Accused

The Council of Ministers' decision raised an enormous commotion among former owners. Very strong words were voiced in assessments of the governmental draft. Krzysztof Laszkiewicz pointed out that the law in its new form will deprive of their rights those who were able to execute their claims based on the Code of Administrative Procedure. Up to now, courts have recognized applications for reimbursements worth a total of 690 billion zlotys, and these amounts have not been paid out by the budget. Those whose property was taken away from them in violation of the legal system do not need the law at all.

According to Lech Prochno-Wroblewski, the draft law prepared by the government is of a partial nature and therefore will settle nothing and nobody will benefit. He also warns that the 500,000 former owners will, from now on, unanimously act to the right wing's advantage because they convinced themselves that heirs to robbers will not give anything back.

On the other hand, Miroslaw Szypowski, chairman of the Polish Union of Real Estate Owners, says that applications will be sent out en masse to the UN Human Rights Committee in Geneva, to debate the rights of former owners whose property interests suffered. The committee's task is to guard the observance of ownership rights, based on the UN Charter that Poland has signed. Says Szypowski: "Verdicts may result in adjudication of many trillions of zlotys, and the Polish state will be the accused."

Sejm Speaker Receives PRC Army General

LD1205182294 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1602 GMT 12 May 94

[Text] Warsaw, 12 May—Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy today received General Zhang Wannian, chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, a Sejm Chancellery communique reads.

"While striving toward NATO and European structures' membership, we will not forget our good cooperation

with China. Our countries have always respected their individual characteristics and their adopted solutions," the Sejm speaker said.

General Wannian, who is in Poland at the invitation of General Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff of the Polish armed forces, shared his impressions of the visit. He stressed the good combat training of the Polish Army and the warm reception he encountered. He expressed the hope that Polish-Chinese relations will continue and that the visit of a Sejm delegation to China, scheduled for the end of May, will strengthen these relations, the communique reads.

ΩPersonnel Chief on Future of Officer Corps

94P20733A

[Editorial Report] At a 20 April news conference, General Roman Harmoza, the recently appointed chief of the Defense Ministry personnel department, discussed the major personnel issues facing the Polish military and, in particular, the plans for the Polish officer corps in a period of downsizing, reorganization, and redefinition of mission. Harmoza explained to the assembled reporters that "the most important task for the Army personnel department at this time is adjusting the Army's structures to the needs of a much smaller army. The reorganization of the armed forces will mean eliminating a number of positions and some military units as well as the creation of new garrisons." Harmoza noted that, as it downsizes, the Polish Army will also be increasing its reliance on career soldiers instead of conscripts. He estimated that, by the turn of the century, half of the Polish Army will be composed of professional soldiers. Nevertheless, the number of career officers will decrease, and promotions will be slower in coming than in the past. Harmoza expressed his belief that "a smaller, elite officers corps will increase the prestige of the Army." Requirements for noncommissioned officers will also be tightened, with secondary-school diplomas being made obligatory. (Currently, only 40 percent of Polish NCO's are secondary-school graduates.) (RZECZPOSP0LITA 21 Apr 94)

However, the general did not foresee the need for forced reductions in the officer corps beyond the strict enforcement of mandatory retirement at age 60. For the time being, the size of the officers corps will be frozen at the 1993 level. All promotions will depend on the number of slots that are vacated and will be dictated by the "needs of the Army" and justified by the "impeccable behavior" of the officer. (GAZETA WYBORCZA 21 Apr 94)

Harmoza emphasized that the change of government after the 1993 elections has not slowed down the process of reforming military institutions. All decisions are made according to the legitimate military hierarchy, with the commander in chief, the minister of defense, and the chief of the General Staff collaborating on all important initiatives. He stated that the decommunization problem no longer exists in the military because a large part of the old officer corps has already left the service. (In the years 1989-94, more than 22,000 officers, including 58 generals, left the Army.) Harmoza assured his listeners that "the Army will not take part in any coup d'etat—the Army today is mature, apolitical, and staffed with new and different people." (TRYBUNA 21 Apr 94)

Central Bank on Foreign Trade, Currency Reserves

WS1305095894 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 13 May 94 p 17

[Article by "sad:" "NBP on Current Exchange With Foreign Countries—Still Negative"]

[Text] *The National Bank of Poland [NBP] reports that, after the first quarter of the year, the foreign trade deficit was $268 million. Despite the deficit, the state's foreign currency reserves exceeded the figure of $5 billion.*

In its monthly reports on a balance of routine exchange, the NBP takes into account trade with foreign countries involving merchandise, services, the repayment of interest rates on foreign debts, and the transfer of hard currency. The NBP calculates the balance on the basis of reports on changes in the balance of bank accounts from several dozen banks that are middlemen in foreign trade transactions.

After the first quarter of this year, the routine exchange deficit was $438 million.

Trade Involving Merchandise

"The trade deficit involving merchandise after the first quarter was lower by $100 million compared with a year ago, but it nevertheless surpassed the $268-million mark," Jozef Sobota, a director at the NBP's Analysis Department, told journalists yesterday [12 May]. Over the same period, export revenues came to $3.489 billion (14.8 percent less than during three months of last year), while import expenditures amounted to $3.757 billion (an increase of 10.2 percent). "Preliminary data indicate that, in April, the trade balance involving merchandise could possibly be positive," director Sobota stated.

Services and Property Income

In the first three months of this year, revenue from the sale of services (this mainly refers to transportation) exceeded expenditures borne of having the services brought in by $74 million, despite the fact that, in March, the deficit was $6 million (last year it was $2 million).

Property income (including, among other things, dividends paid to Polish companies for participation in foreign companies) amounted to $17 million after the first quarter (a year ago it was $24 million).

Interest Rates and Transfers

The negative balance of interest rates being paid on foreign debts was $1.119 billion, which is a decrease of $351 million compared with a year ago. This happened despite the fact that we had to repay $634 million to the Paris Club in March.

Official transfers amounted to $765 million, out of which $734 million was the 80 percent of interest rates that the Paris Club decided to write off for us. After the first quarter, the balance of private transfers was $93 million (last year it was $106 million).

Dollar Reserves

Despite the trade deficit, the NBP's official reserves were $5.080 billion after the first quarter. The reserves rose by as much as $704 million just since March, and that figure includes the $504 million of credit obtained from the IMF.

In the view of the NBP, the so-called border-area exports, among others, had a very big impact on the level of the reserves: Tourists leave hard currency, thus contributing to a surplus in the purchases of hard currency at hard-currency exchange units; that surplus was $758 million.

PDSR Leaders Condemn Opposition's Tactics

AU1305084094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0400 GMT 13 May 94

[Text] Yesterday afternoon the members of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] Central Executive Bureau held a meeting, at their request, with President Ion Iliescu to examine the current political situation and the role to be played by the PDSR, as the government party, to solve the political, economic, and social problems facing Romania.

According to a communique sent to us, the members of the PDSR's Central Executive Bureau do not consider that there is currently a political crisis in Romania, and the activity of the institutions of the law-governed state is taking place in conformity with the Constitution and the laws of the country. In this context they acknowledged the efforts made by President Iliescu to establish a climate favorable for the internal and international stability of the country.

The second part of the meeting was devoted to the examination of certain issues related to the PDSR's current preoccupations, both at the central and local levels, the activity of its factions in both houses of Parliament, and relations with the parties supporting Nicolae Vacaroiu's cabinet and with the other parliamentary political parties.

The PDSR communique emphasizes that the Central Executive Bureau has found that lately the attacks intensified against the party and its top leadership, and especially against PDSR Executive Chairman Adrian Nastase. According to the communique, the members of the PDSR Central Executive Bureau reject, quote, such demolition tactics that are not foreign to certain forces of the opposition, unquote.

The PDSR Central Executive Bureau has decided that coherent and firm actions should be initiated at all levels against corruption and the phenomenon of infraction, to rebuild the population's confidence in the authorities of the law-governed state, says the PDSR communique signed by PDSR Deputy Chairman Ion Solcanu.

Tudjman, Izetbegovic Address Liaison Group

AU1205191794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 12 May 94

[Text] As we have announced, Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman today agreed to send an identical letter to the ministers of a liaison group in Geneva that will venture on a quest tomorrow to restore peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the two presidents' letter, the following is stated, among other things:

The delegations of the Bosniaks and the Croats in Vienna yesterday reached a concrete and detailed agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina's internal setup on the basis of the Washington agreement. This agreement offers a chance for an overall political solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina on a just basis. The Bosniaks and Croats do not harbor any aspirations for foreign property and territories, or the rights of others. We ask your help in the negotiations with the Serbian side. In our opinion, we must make it plain to both the Serbian side and the international public, that you are opposed to:

—aggression and ethnic cleansing being rewarded,

—that the conclusions of the London conference are your conclusions, too, and,

—that you will neutralize the Serbian military machinery in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia by political and other means if the Serbs reject a peaceful and reasonable solution.

If we are to accomplish peace we need a firm stance. The decisions that you will make tomorrow are very important and will determine the course of international events, especially in the regions where the Communist regime has collapsed. So reads the identically-worded letters that Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman sent to the liaison group ministers.

Izetbegovic Wants ICO as 'Equal' at Summit

AU1205191894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 12 May 94

[Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, has sent a letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, and Jacques Delors, chairman of the EU Ministerial Council. In it Izetbegovic demands that the Islamic Conference Organization [ICO] be included in the liaison group for Bosnia as an equal partner.

Turkish President Demirel called President Izetbegovic over the phone, congratulating him on reaching an accord to establish the Bosniak-Croatian federation. Turkey believes that this is a very important step toward peace which should in the future engage the Serbian side also, said President Demirel, promising that his country would continue to mediate in all initiatives and actions that lead toward the end of bloodshed and destruction of this country's economic base.

Federation To Cover 58 Percent of Territory

AU1205151294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 12 May 94

[Interview with Edhem Bicakcic, member of the Bosniak delegation at the Vienna talks, by Amir Hodzic in Vienna; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Hodzic] Mr. Bicakcic, how much territory will the federation cover—its borders have been set—and, percentage-wise, how many people will it include?

[Bicakcic] This issue—establishing the external borders of the federation—was one of the easier issues, and the Bosniak and Croatian delegations relatively quickly reached an agreement on it. The territory of the federation covers 58 percent of the territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the 3 percent of the Sarajevo district territory.

On this territory the Bosniaks and the Croats are in the majority, which means that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly's decision that territories with majority Bosniak and Croatian populations should be included in the federation, has been followed to the letter. Apart from the 58 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina territory, the Croatian and the Bosniak delegations also expressed an interest in places that would remain under the Serbian aggressor's occupation where Bosniaks and Croats were in the majority. These are larger cities such as Bosanski Petrovac, Bosanska Gradiska, Bosanska Dubica, Bijeljina, Janja, and [word indistinct], which cannot be covered by the federation territory, but—in future negotiations, when they take place—we will try to obtain from the Serbian aggressor the protection of human rights for the population in these areas.

Serbs Reject Vienna Accord, Percentages

LD1205182094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1706 GMT 12 May 94

[Text] Jagodina, 12 May (TANJUG)—Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the republic of Srpska assembly, said this evening that the republic of Srpska rejected the Vienna agreement between the Muslims and Croats, by which they were asking for 58 percent of the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"This is a provocation and a form of pressure by the Muslims and their overlords and is out of the question," Krajisnik said in a statement for Radio Jagodina. "Whatever is over 50 percent of the territory—regardless of quality—is out of the question," he specified.

"Percentages—how much territory everyone will get—depend on numerous elements in this struggle and these divisions," Krajisnik stressed. "Without maps, everything is an auction and pressure." "I cannot see where the Muslims and Croats got the idea that they are

entitled to so much territory, they simply cannot lay claim to it—they are neither military nor moral victors—unless some of their mentors want this in order to monitor the Serbs more easily," Krajisnik underlined.

Commenting on tomorrow's Geneva meeting, Krajisnik said: "There might be some results because this high-level gathering will also include those who want peace in these regions."

"Some other forces want war in the case of Brcko, and they are instigating the Muslims and Croats; if it were not for Brcko they would have passed a resolution that we would oppose and would thus have rekindled the war," Krajisnik said. "Posavina is of vital importance for the national interest of the Serbian people and there is no such force that could occupy it."

"We were embittered at our assembly in Brcko because of Muslim shelling—we had let them pass through our territories so many times, we had forgiven and yielded so much, they could have displayed at least a semblance of respect during the assembly, at least toward civilians and the innocent," Krajisnik underlined.

Srpska Assembly Discusses Future Peace Talks

LD1105230694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2109 GMT 11 May 94

[Text] Brcko, 11 May (TANJUG)—At its 40th session held on 10-11 May in Brcko, the people's assembly of the Srpska republic [RS] adopted conclusions in which it defines the platform of the RS at future peace talks, advocating the cessation of hostilities, equal treatment of the RS, and elimination of pressure on the Serbs, including sanctions. The following are the conclusions of the RS assembly:

1. The platform on further moves of the RS delegation at peace talks, which the RS people's assembly adopted at a session held on 20 April 1991, remains the basic working document of the RS delegation.

2. There are no preconditions for the general cessation of hostilities and for the resumption of the peace process, but the RS delegation has been charged with a task of ensuring that the RS is given equal treatment at the talks; that is, that all forms of pressure on the Serb people, including the sanctions, are eliminated.

3. Future talks on former Bosnia-Herzegovina are to be conducted within the framework of a new peace conference. The results so far of the peace conference on former Yugoslavia—agreed to by the three sides in the conflict and by all the relevant international factors—must be taken into account. The basis for a territorial separation remain the actual situation on the ground and other relevant factors, such as the existence of two independent state entities in the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina: the RS and the Muslim-Croat federation.

4. Brcko and Posavina are the component parts of the RS and are of vital national importance. The assembly therefore rejects any attempt on the part of the international community to alter these territories as something other than vital territories for the entire Serb nation.

5. The bombing of Serb positions by NATO and missile attacks on Serb civilians in the vicinity of Tuzla by an UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] unit are hostile actions against the Serb nation, and all such actions must cease.

6. The assembly most strongly condemns the atrocious attack on Brcko by the Muslim army at the time the RS assembly was in session, which took the lives of four innocent civilians while several civilians were seriously or lightly injured.

Most Parties Supportive of Vienna Agreement

AU1205203194

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian in its 1700 GMT newscast on 12 May broadcasts the reactions of various political parties to the Bosniak-Croatian accord reached in Vienna:

It is reported that "the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] is hailing the Vienna agreement, considering it to be a huge step toward peace. This agreement is also an important step toward the preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent and integral state. For various reasons the SDA has been of the opinion that the first president of the federation should be current President of the Presidency Alija Izetbegovic, which the public has been informed of with a statement from the 3 April session of the SDA Executive Concil. However, on that occasion already President Izetbegovic expressed the opinion that the agreement and implementation of the federation's constitution must not be put at risk on this issue, especially if the Croats demonstrate willingness to embrace solutions that are in the interest of Bosnia-Herzegovina. When the talks became deadlocked two days ago, President Izetbegovic informed the members of our negotiating team in Vienna of his position in writing, and this, among other things, helped to overcome the crisis. The Muslim people must have faith in the decisions of President Izetbegovic and there is no reason for concern. The SDA has an absolute majority in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly and according to the constitution of the federation, the Assembly has overall control over the work of the army and the government. Besides, President Izetbegovic remains the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency until peace is restored. Finally, President Izetbegovic remains the undisputed leader of the Muslim people in the country and outside it," the SDA statement declares.

"The Croatian Peasants' Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina believes that the Vienna agreement is yet another step toward the goal established by the Washington agreement. The party's opinion is that all this represents a

painstaking progress toward the goal that is not as close as it would appear. The Croatian Peoples' Party considers it most important that the war between the two peoples has stopped." It is also reported that "the Croatian Peasants' Party expresses hope that with the assistance of the international community and the instruments that are at its disposal, the Serbian side, too, will join the agreement of the two peoples to preserve the integral Bosnia-Herzegovina within the internationally recognized borders."

"The municipal committee of the Croatian Democratic Community Sarajevo expresses its satisfaction over the outcome of the talks in Vienna, hoping that the implementation of this agreement will be completed soon, secretary of this party Stjepan (Dacic), stated for B-H PRESS. He expressed hope that this agreement will give impetus to a resolution of all disputes and promote the relations between the Croatian and the Bosniak people. We expect that the constitutional assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation will soon pass appropriate decisions that will speed up the implementation of the Vienna agreement."

The radio then goes on to report that "the Liberal Bosniak Organization [LBO] is of the opinion that the creation of situation that led to uncertainty in the implementation of the provisions of the federation's constitution was unnecessary, LBO Vice President Salih [word indistinct], said in light of the [word indistinct] agreement on federation in Vienna. According to him it is clear from this agreement that it involved a conflict of a personal nature and the grand aspirations of some individuals to assume certain posts. The LBO supports the decision that the function of federation president be performed by a member of one people and the post of prime minister by a representative of the other people. In this sense the party supports the president of the federation coming from among the Croatian people, however, this candidate must be determined for an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina. Regarding the cantonal setup, the LBO does not consider it to be a firm territorial form of demarcation but rather an administrative form of government."

In contrast to the above reactions, the radio reports that Dragutin Zvonimir Cicak, head of the Croatian Civic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Zenica, "has said that the agreement on cantonal [word indistinct] is causing the Croatian Civic Party concern." Cicak adds that, "we cannot get into the heads of those who are working on the Bosnia-Herzegovina state constitution that the Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens are sovereign over the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina territory." Cicak further states that the drawing of internal borders with ethnic connotations is "nonsensical." "We are once more creating an atmosphere that will again lead to more conflicts in linguistics, education, sport, culture, and so on, and which will again lead nowhere." He assails the allocation of ministerial and other functions on an ethnic basis as "idiocy leading nowhere," because the country is currently suffering from an acute shortage of capable cadres anyway.

Izetbegovic: Serbs To Withdraw From Gorazde

AU1305105194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 13 May 94

[Text] Esteemed listeners, we have just received a statement from the office of the president of the Presidency.

According to reliable information, the aggressor will withdraw by tomorrow morning 3 km from the center of Gorazde, from both banks of the Drina River. In order to make this possible, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will temporarily hand over the point Mala Biserna to the control of a British unit of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR]. If the aggressor does not comply with the agreement in full, the British have given guarantees that the positions on Mala Biserna will be returned to the Gorazde defenders at 1200 on 14 May.

This offer has been conveyed to our side by the aggressor via UNPROFOR. Sefid Buljubasic, commander of the Eastern Bosnian Operative Group, has informed the General Staff about this offer. President Izetbegovic has agreed to the plan since the departure of the Serbian aggressor creates the conditions not only for the further normalization of life in the enclave, but also for the return of the expelled population to the right bank of the Drina River.

This is contained in a statement from the office of the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency.

Juppe Condemns U.S. Senate Vote on Embargo

LD1205200794 Paris France-2 Teletext in French 1927 GMT 12 May 94

[Text] Alain Juppe reacted on Thursday to the U.S. Senate's vote calling for the lifting of the arms embargo imposed by the United Nations against Bosnia. The French foreign minister said that it is "almost the worst of all possible solutions." Speaking in Washington, where he earlier met Bill Clinton, Alain Juppe said that this solution is "not efficient".

UNPROFOR: Vehicle Attack 'Not an Accident'

AU1305101994 Paris AFP in English 0958 GMT 13 May 94

[Text] Sarajevo, May 13 (AFP)—A UN military observer killed at the edge of the Sarajevo exclusion zone was a Malaysian, UN forces spokesman Eric Chaperon said Friday [13 May], adding that the shell which hit his vehicle was "not an accident." Another UN observer injured in the same incident Thursday was an Egyptian but his life was not in danger, Major Chaperon said. He identified the dead observer as Major Ariffin Zakaria. He said his body was to be flown to Kuala Lumpur Friday and a brief military ceremony would be held in

his honor at Sarajevo airport. He said the Egyptian was Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Kamal El Din, who suffered shrapnel wounds to his legs and was evacuated by helicopter to a Canadian medical unit in Visoko, northwest of Sarajevo.

The UN military spokesman said a single shell was fired on their vehicle after it got stuck in mud at Cermenica, 15 kilometers (eight miles) northeast of Visoko. "It is not an accident of firing," he stressed. But he refused to say whether the shell had been fired by Bosnian Serb forces who have a position only a kilometer (less than a mile) from where the observers' truck got bogged down.

The two UN soldiers had called for assistance.

The spokesman said a Bosnian Army soldier was also wounded when he and a colleague on board a tractor came under fire as they were trying to tow away the UN vehicle. He said the Bosnian soldier had been hit in the back, but was out of danger.

French Aid Workers To Be Released 'Next Week'

LD1205225494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2210 GMT 12 May 94

[Text] Belgrade, 12 May (TANJUG)—The criminal charges in the legal proceedings against the 11 members of the French humanitarian organization Premiere Urgence, accused of smuggling arms for the Muslims, will be requalified to their advantage, SRNA has learned from sources close to Radovan Karadzic, president of the republic of Srpska. The entire case will be taken over by the republic of Srpska's civilian judiciary. SRNA claims that the French people will be released from detention as early as next week.

Army Captures Strategic Point Near Gracanica

AU1305092894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 13 May 94

[Report by Izudin Durakovic from Gracanica]

[Text] Over the last few days the chetniks have been intensively shelling the defense lines and civilian targets in the theater of operations of Operative Group Gracanica. Yesterday they shelled Malesici, Gracanica, Brijesnica, Klokotnica, Lukavica, and Lukavac. They tried to infiltrate a sabotage group into the village of [word indistinct] but it was intercepted in time and forced to disperse. The enemy has also been intensively moving its armored and mechanized forces, concentrating them mostly toward the defense lines in the the 117th Lukavac Brigade's theater of operations.

During all this, the Serbian media keeps broadcasting unscrupulous lies intended to keep up the shaky morale of the chetniks. The Serbian media keeps talking about the clashes for Vijenac, and the chetnik's successful defense of this strategically important point. The truth, however, is that Vijenac has been under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army for three days now, following a fierce counteroffensive when it captured Vijenac after just a few hours of fighting. Five more villages, stretching across some 9 square km, were liberated in the process. In this operation—which was carried out in accordance with the strictest military criteria—the Lilies [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army soldiers] of [Commander] Osman Puskar and the 119th Brigade captured 21 chetniks, and killed twice as many. As a result of this battle, the Serbian aggressor again violated the arms embargo against our forces, leaving our army better equipped by a T-34 tank, a self-propelled gun, eight mortars, a (PSP-type) Vis, four antiaircraft machine guns, three antiaircraft guns, and lots more besides.

In retaliation for this defeat on the front, the enemy has indiscriminately [words indistinct] of all calibers on civilian targets. However, this will not check our fighters in their defense leading to final liberation from the chetnik phalanx.

Russia Condemns Muslim Attacks on Brcko

LD1205135394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1303 GMT 12 May 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Moscow, May 12 (TANJUG)—The Russian Foreign Ministry on Thursday [12 May] condemned Muslim attacks on Brcko. Moscow believes that such attacks lead to further escalation of conflicts and that they are especially dangerous prior to the forthcoming ministerial conference in Geneva. The chief diplomats of the United States, Russia and the European Union and officials of the United Nations will meet in Geneva on Friday to try to definitively determine the framework for a political settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The situation around the Serb town of Brcko in the north of Bosnia is currently at the focus of attention of political organs and the media in Moscow. Radio and television stations broadcast the news that the U.N. Security Council had condemned the Muslim attack on Brcko in which four civilians were killed and 13 wounded. It is believed here that the current situation in Bosnia, especially around Brcko, does not inspire a great deal of hope for an early settlement of the conflict.

Official sources here say that on both sides—Serb and Muslim—there are forces inclined to military confrontation who believe that a political settlement is impossible. Moscow has announced that its position in Geneva will be 'very resolute' but it is not clear whether it will make any new proposals. Russia insists on an agreement that the warring sides resume talks as soon as possible. If this is not achieved, the war could continue indefinitely and the consequences could be disastrous, official sources in Moscow maintain.

Army Soldiers Charged With Killing Priests

LD1305075194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0700 GMT 13 May 94

[Text] The regional military prosecution office in Sarajevo has charged four members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army with killing Franciscan priests Nikica Milicevic and Leon Mato Mikic at the Franciscan monastery in Fojnica in November last year.

Muslim Infighting Continues in Western Bosnia

LD1305012894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2303 GMT 12 May 94

[Text] Belgrade, May 12 (TANJUG)—Radio Sarajevo, loyal to the Bosnian Moslem regime of hardliner Alija Izetbegovic, on Thursday again reported fighting between rival Moslem factions in western Bosnia-Herzegovina. That part of the war-wracked former Yugoslav republic has since last autumn been the scene of fierce clashes between troops loyal to [word indistinct] leader Izetbegovic and supporters of his moderate rival and local leader Fikret Abdic. Abdic's supporters proclaimed their own autonomous province of western Bosnia in late September 1993, and have since signed friendship and cooperation treaties with the other two Bosnian nations—Serbs and Croats.

Radio Sarajevo said that provincial forces on Thursday kept up a sustained attack, the brunt of which was directed at the village of Todorovo where 'nearly all facilities have been demolished, including mosques and schools, and there was a considerable number of dead and wounded.' The source said that the Moslem army's 5th Corps, loyal to Izetbegovic, had managed to regain some strategically important positions captured by Abdic's troops the day before. The reports could not be independently confirmed.

Bosnian Croats To Accept New Croatian Currency

LD1205211894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2051 GMT 12 May 94

[Text] Zagreb, May 12 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Croat Premier Jadranko Prlic said on Thursday that neighbouring Croatia's new currency, the kuna, would be used also in the Bosnian Croat state of Herzeg-Bosna, Mostar-based Herzeg-Bosna Radio said. Croatia will officially circulate the new currency on Independence Day. May 30.

The currency has the same name—the kuna—as that used in the Nazi-puppet Independent State of Croatia during World War Two.

Immediately after Croatia's secession from the former Yugoslav Federation nearly three years ago, Bosnian Croats embraced the breakaway state's then currency—the Croatian dinar—thus making clear to one and all their ultimate objective—secession from Bosnia-Herzegovina and union with Croatia. The Croatian news agency HINA has quoted Prlic as admitting that there are forces in Herzeg-Bosna which oppose the implementation of the Washington agreement on a Croat-Moslem federation in Bosnia- Herzegovina. There are political forces among the Croats which oppose the agreement, and there are also those who have lost members of immediate family in the fighting against the Moslems and do not want a union, Prlic explained.

Five-day U.S.-sponsored Croatian-Moslem talks at the U.S. embassy in Vienna ended on Wednesday in an agreement on a cantonal division of the future federation and the appointment of the two nations' officials to top state positions by rote.

Tudjman, Izetbegovic Discuss Vienna Agreement

LD1205135994 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 12 May 94

[Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman spoke on the telephone to his Bosnian counterpart Alija Izetbegovic today, and expressed satisfaction with an agreement reached by the Croatian and Bosnian delegations in Vienna on Wednesday evening, the presidential office said in a statement today. The two presidents agree that the implementation of the Washington agreement on establishing a Muslim-Croatian federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina should continue. They also talked about solving technical issues to enable President Tudjman to visit Sarajevo as soon as possible, and about their joint stand on the contact group and the upcoming meeting of foreign ministers in Geneva. Tudjman asked Izetbegovic to use his authority to step up the process of finding the missing Croats from Bugojno.

Granic, Bosnian Croat Leader Interviewed

LD1205130494 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2145 GMT 11 May 94

[Studio interview with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic and Bosnian Croat leader Kresimir Zubak by unidentified announcer in Zagreb on 11 May; from the "Picture Versus Picture" program—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] I am pleased to welcome Kresimir Zubak [Bosnian Croat leader] and [Croatian Foreign Minister] Mate Granic to our studio. Mr. Zubak, let me start by asking you about the four agreements that have been reached. The first agreement is about the president of the future Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who will be a Croatian. Will you be the first president of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Zubak] Well, we did not discuss the persons who will be president, for instance the vice president, but we agreed that a Croatian will be the president during the first six months of the transitional period. According to the transitional provisions of the Federation's constitution, the constitution should be implemented within a period of six months. However, it is obvious that this period is too short and we are already behind schedule as far as the election of the Federation's president is concerned. We were supposed to elect the president of the Federation within 30 days but we did not reach a political agreement and that period was prolonged. Everything should be implemented within six months, but realistically this period will last a bit longer. However, we agreed that a Croatian would be the president over the initial six months. If the constitution of the Federation is not entirely implemented within this period, then the next president will be a Bosniak-Muslim.

We also agreed that the first president during the period after the Federal elections should be a Bosniak-Muslim. I would like to say that we signed the drafts of the documents today, and that the documents will we verified and signed as draft agreements on Saturday 14 May in Geneva. In this form of proposals, they will be offered for adoption to the constitutional parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] I would like to ask Croatian Foreign Minister Granic: What is your impression of this latest map of the internal political organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Does it appear to you that a good political compromise has been reached?

[Granic] A very good compromise; it is a huge step forward in the implementation of the Washington agreement. It is also a just one. This is a compromise that paves the way ahead. It benefits the Bosniak as well as the Croatian people, it benefits the federation. It also benefits our future confederal partners, the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia, as well as the whole world, has a great deal of interest in the materialization of this agreement. I can say, for example, that the United States' Madeleine Albright and Warren Christopher phoned several times during the day to ask about our progress. In any case, the agreement was met with a great deal of interest and satisfaction. All the more so, since it took place before Friday, before the talks in Geneva. Many things are clearer now.

[Announcer] I would like you to comment on the statement we heard tonight made by U.S. special envoy Redman, according to which the talks yielded a different result from what had been expected, but that this result is better.

[Granic] This refers to the formation of cantons six and seven, as they surely speed up the organization of the Federation. This is a great step forward. This obliterates some problems; for example, it is going to be far easier for the EU [European Union] to take over the town of Mostar. There will no longer be [word indistinct] problems. The EU intends to restore the town fast, to revive its life, to return its refugees. It will of course be the center of the canton, as Mr. Zubak said. Hence the fact that this agreement has been reached is of exceptional importance for Croatia. One should bear in mind that now policies will be coordinated. This is something which is already being carried out, not only as regards some individual current issues such as communications, refugees, and education, but many strategic issues, too.

[Announcer] Mr Zubak, these eight cantons we have seen, do they constitute those 58 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory with which the Croat-Muslim-Bosniak side jointly embarks on negotiations with the Serbian side.

[Zubak] This percentage does not include...[pauses] This also includes the area of the city of Sarajevo, about 3 percent of territory. Its special status ought to be under UN administration. Hence, the cantons account for 55 percent.

[Announcer] Apart from these four agreements, is there any agreement now on, is there a firm approach to negotiations with the Serbian side?

[Zubak] As you can see, having established the agreement on the external borders of the federation we departed from the following principle: In those areas where the Bosniak and the Croatian people are in the majority, they are really and objectively entitled to demand that those areas should be within our future commom state, our federation. We drafted such a territorial organization of the federation, which includes 58 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the proviso that it should be pointed out that not even this covers all those areas where these two peoples are in the absolute majority.

Let's take the example of Bijeljina: In total the Croatian and Bosniak population is in the majority, but these people have not been included in the federation.

[Announcer] Let's go back again to the second agreement out of the four, the agreement on the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It will be headed by a prime minister from the ranks of the Bosniak Muslim people, and out of its 17 members, 6 will be Croatians. Does it mean at least 6 or up to 6?

[Zubak] Well, you see, we came to a preliminary political agreement in Sarajevo to have a 15-member government, including the prime minister and his deputy. However, during the talks and negotiations in Vienna we came to the conclusion that it would be more opportune to have a 17-member government. As a result, we came to a new political agreement, under which 6 government ministers would come from the ranks of the Croatian people. Since we agreed that the prime minister should come from the ranks of the Bosniak Muslim people, his deputy, under the constitution, will at the same time be the defense minister. In other words, the Croats have been given the right to nominate their candidate for this post.

We also agreed that another four ministers, including one without portfolio, should be from the ranks of the Croatian people.

Why is this necessary? We need this in order to ensure that the Croats are given the opportunity to realize their constitutional right of insisting, when they deem it necessary, that in other words one-third of the ministers will have the right to ask that, in the case of issues considered to be of vital importance, decisions be made through voting and consensus. It was therefore necessary to ensure that one-third of the government comprises Croatians, providing one of them is prime minister or rather deputy prime minister.

[Announcer] To continue in the same vein, can you tell us how the implementation of the agreement will proceed.

[Zubak] When we first of all signed the framework and then the entire agreement in Washington, various comments were made, various views and forecasts expressed, various expectations were voiced, about how the agreement could be implemented on the ground. Through organized political action we have succeeded in persuading and explaining to the people on the ground all the advantages of the agreement, that it is an historical necessity, that it will be instrumental in realizing all the political goals of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and of the Croatian people in general. With this approach we succeeded in persuading the people that this is the best solution and, at the current juncture, of historic importance for the Croatian people. I believe that through a politically synchronized and coordinated action we shall succeed in explaining and persuading the people, political officials, and leaders of the people that this solution—the cantonal arrangement—will serve the political and all other interests of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the same time, the cantonal arrangement neither threatens nor questions the interests of the Bosniak people. In the areas where we failed to achieve greater territorial divisions, tensions between the two peoples would most likely have deepened if a solution had not been reached. We see this as a compromise that will make it impossible for either one or the other people to be outvoted. They are both absolutely equal and in such an atmsophere...

[Announcer, interrupting] In other words, you do not expect changes or problems on the ground?

[Zubak] Well, there will probably be resistance. However, as I said, through a synchornized, coordinated, and planned action, I think we will succeed in explaining and persuading the people that this solution is a good one.

[Announcer] Mr. Granic, a new ministerial conference is expected in Geneva on Friday in which America, Russia, the EU, and the United Nations are to take part. What is the importance of this agreement, its completion, and its signing, for further peace talks on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Granic] The picture now is more complete. In any case, it will help in achieving a final solution. Without this agreement the issue would have remained less clear. In light of this agreement, it is certain that the position of the United States, which has invested most to have this agreement reached, and of some other states, especially Germany, will be clearer in the search for a final solution. This means that the pressure on the Serbs will definitely be stronger.

[Announcer] What can we expect now? It seems that it is the Serbians in Bosnia-Herzegovina who are under greatest pressure. A fresh conference is being prepared, the Croats and Bosniak Muslims have reached an agreement. Do you feel that this is the turning point and that the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina is about to be solved?

[Granic] Well, in the light of our experience of many conferences, it is nevertheless realistic to expect that this will be the most serious of the meetings, that it has been approached seriously, and that it takes place with an agreement in place between the Bosniaks and the Croatians. In other words, preconditions exist for a serious conference.

I would like to add that, as far as the Republic of Croatia is concerned, this agreement will considerably strengthen the position of the Republic of Croatia, in particular in its negotiations with the international financial institutions, with the EU, and that in any case, this is yet another step further in strengthening Croatia's international position, since Croatia is seen here as a confederal partner. Of course, the negotiations were between the Croatians and the Bosniaks, Mr. Silajdzic and Mr. Zubak, but we are cosignatories of both the preliminary and the final Washington agreement. Accordingly, our responsiblity for implementing this agreement is great.

[Announcer] Mr. Granic and Mr. Zubak, thank you for taking part in this evening's edition of Picture versus Picture. I wish you a great deal of success in implementing the Vienna agreement.

UNPROFOR Deploys on Demarcation Line

LD1205173394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1425 GMT 12 May 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Knin, May 12 (TANJUG)—The UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] spokesman for the Sector South M. Roberts said that the peacekeepers have started deployment Thursday [12 May] to take over full control of the demarcation line between the republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) and Croatia.

The RSK was declared in 1991 by the Serbs on their ethnic and historic lands in the former Republic of Croatia in response to the latter's forcible secession from former Yugoslavia and the downgrading of the Serbs in Croatia to a national minority. Since the spring of 1992 RSK has been declared a U.N. Protected Area (UNPA).

UNPROFOR troops have been sent to locations where some units of the conflicting sides still remain, Roberts told a regular press conference. This marks the beginning of the implementation of the Akashi-Martic agreement reached in talks held on May 9 in Knin. Under the agreement the remaining troops of the two sides should fully withdraw by May 20. Speakivg about Akashi's visit to Knin and his talks with the RSK leadership there Roberts confirmed that the U.N. special envoy was satisfied with the results of the talks and that he had the impression that great progress had been made in the last 15 days towards the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, reached on March 30 in the Russian Embassy in Zagreb.

Roberts also pointed to the difficulties in clearing up the mines on the main communication links, as well as on local roads, and that it was still unsafe for the population to return to the villages in Ravni Kotari. People nevertheless come to inspect their houses and land and some have started clearing up the debris, he added.

Roberts said that special Canadian units with 35 experts would be dispatched to speed up the mine-clearing process and warned that the work could not be accomplished if both sides did not submit detailed maps of the mine fields. So far only the North Dalmatian Corps of the Bosnian Serb Army has done this, Roberts said adding that the maps supplied by the Croatian side were inaccurate. Since the beginning of the implementation of the cease-fire agreement the UNPROFOR has set up 69 observation posts along the 310-km long demarcation line in Sector South. A Jordanian battalion is now being deployed on Mt Velebit where observation posts already exist to monitor the cease-fire. The peacekeeprs are also setting up observation posts on Mts Dinara and Svilja.

Five Civilians Killed by Serbs in UN Zone

LD1205135794 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 12 May 94

[Text] We learned today about yet another chetnik crime in the UN Protected Area [UNPA]. Four persons wearing camouflage uniforms stopped eight civilians who were travelling on tractors in Batinska Rijeka near Daruvar. Having taken them prisoner and tied them up, they then took them to a deserted farm where five of them were killed. Three managed to escape. One young man sustained no injuries. [sentence as heard]

Investigating judges from the Bjelovar county court, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs police and of the Bjelovar police have begun an investigation. Interior Minister Ivan Jarnjak and his aides visited the scene of the crime.

Serbian Army Denies Part in Vukovije Murders

LD1205220794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2127 GMT 12 May 94

[Text] Belgrade, 12 May (TANJUG)—The command of the 18th Corps of the Serbian Army of Krajina [SVK] this evening denied any involvement by its soldiers in the brutal murders in the vicinity of Daruvar on 11 May. The Croatian side is accusing the Serbian army and Serbs in western Slavonia of having committed these murders. An official statement by the 18th Corps' command says: The corps' command was informed by UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] at 1800 on 12 May 1994 that a multiple murder had been committed. Five persons were killed and two others wounded in the village of Vukovije, northeast of Daruvar, at 2230 on 11 May. The corps' command expresses regret at this tragic event but vehemently denies any connection between corps' members and the incident in question.

By resorting to its well-known propaganda methods, the Croatian side is trying, yet again, to accuse the Serb side—before the investigation conducted by UNPROFOR and the Croatian police has been concluded. We believe that such conduct is not conducive to the building of trust necessary for the implementation of the cease-fire agreement, says the statement issued by the 18th Corps of the SVK.

Istrian Democratic Assembly Demands Autonomy

AU1305105294 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 9 May 94 pp 8-9

[Interview with Ivan Jakovcic, chairman of the Istrian Democratic Assembly, by Edi Jurkovic; place and date not given: "Istria Is Indeed for Croatia, but...."]

[Text] *There are many reasons for talking with Ivan Jakovcic, chairman of the Istrian Democratic Assembly [IDS]. The course of events lately has unsettled relations between Zagreb and Istria. It began in mid-April with the foundation of the Council for Istria, that did not include the IDS representatives who had won the elections in Istria. Furthermore, the Statute of the Istrian County was annulled. In a very tense situation, with the media scrutinizing the situation through its magnifying glass, in late April the IDS organized an extraordinary convention of the party in Rovinj, at which heretical demands for a special, autonomous status for Istria were stated again.*

[Jurkovic] How do you assess the new tension between Zagreb and Istria?

[Jakovcic] There are no changes in relations between official Zagreb and Istria. That is, the consistent policy of President Franjo Tudjman is proven to be so only by the example of Istria. From the 1990 electoral campaign up to now we have had a situation of continuous depreciation of the Istrian authorities—represented by the Social Democratic Party before, and now by the IDS—and the rejection of any initiative coming from Istria.

[Jurkovic] A different interpretation is also possible, that you are looking for bad blood beforehand. You condemned the foundation of the Council for Istria from the outset.

[Jakovcic] It is solely official Zagreb that is to blame for such relations between the central administration and Istria. I can prove this quite simply. In the referendum for independent and sovereign Croatia a great majority of the Istrian people had voted for it, just as they voted for the IDS in the elections. Which is to say, Istria is indeed for Croatia, but for a democratic Croatia, rather than for one ruled by the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ].

We have to give careful consideration to any initiative made by the state leadership, because any initiative by official Zagreb in these four years has been aimed at crushing the authorities in Istria, and causing disorder. It is not a coincidence that as many as three messages came from Zagreb—first, there was the establishment of the Council for Istria, which I commented very cautiously, though it is not true that I rejected a priori the establishment of that council. I just wanted to have some latitude in order to see what it was all about. Immediately thereafter the Statute was annulled—actually it happened on the same day. And thirdly, we received at the same time the message from the parliament's highest officials that the problem of Istria may as well be settled by the police, the army, or the executive boards. Of course, such an attitude already verges upon totalitarian methods, which we have to condemn.

[Jurkovic] How would you comment the assessment, which I personally hold to be true, that the HDZ and IDS work according to the principle of two vessels linked together, so that pressure applied by HDZ strengthens the IDS, and vice versa. In concrete terms, does the IDS have any use for the actions taken by the HDZ?

[Jakovcic] Neither Istria nor the IDS can make any use of the attacks by the HDZ, or steps taken by President Tudjman, because any straining of relations between Istria and official Zagreb in no way benefits Istria, nor, therefore, Croatia as a whole. The suspension of democracy that is being announced means "good night" to Croatia. The HDZ, which is thus making internal enemies, follows the logic: Divide et impera [divide and rule]. It wants to divide the citizens of Croatia in order to be able to control them more easily. Of course, Istria will resist this, because we want to be fully present in the Croatian political life with our principles. That is the problem that our dispute is about.

[Jurkovic] Will the IDS agree to take part in the activities of the Council for Istria after all that has been said these days?

[Jakovcic] In view of the current circumstances I do not see any possibility of the IDS representatives' taking part in the Council's work. Still, I cannot foresee what the County Assembly will decide.

To say that the Council will be engaged in economic, cultural, or similar matters means to suspend the county's leadership, and indirectly the Croatian government, because that is a job of the executive bodies. After all, I may well feel that the Council is an attempt to create parallelism and overthrow the authorities, but what I really want to feel is that it is a council that would make suggestions to the president to reconsider an appropriate status for Istria, in view of all the events, the election results, the mood among the citizens, and Istria's surroundings. That would be a positive advance, and we might possibly discuss our joining the Council.

[Jurkovic] In addition to the Council the relations are tensed also because of the annulment of the Statute of the Istrian county, for which you said recently that it was the minimum of what Istria wanted.

We Are Defending Our Country's Reputation

[Jakovcic] Firstly, the Statute is in compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, and we shall prove this at the Constitutional Court, and show that Istria absolutely observes Croatia's legislation. Of course, the Statute is not an expression of the political will of Istria's citizens, for neither the country's system, nor the legislation are an expression of the will of Istria's citizens. You remember how we struggled in the parliament to change the bill on the territorial organization of the Republic of Croatia, so that the territory could be organized according to the historic regions, but our efforts failed. The Statute is not an expression of the political attitudes of the IDS, because we demand that Croatia be regionalized in such a way that the regional assemblies are given the legislative and governing authority. We see modern Croatia as a country of regions founded on the tradition of Stjepan Radic's [Croatian politician, assassinated in 1926 because he supported independent Croatia] constitution that read, let me quote: "Counties must adopt regulations, of a quality equal to that of laws." Another buttress of our regionalism is the European standard of organizing regions. That is a condition sine qua non [necessary condition] of the IDS activities.

[Jurkovic] It is precisely your advocating Europe that is disputable. For instance, you are being reproached for having taken a copy of the bill on the constitutional law on Istria with you to Geneva without the knowledge of the Foreign Ministry. How did that happen, and why?

[Jakovcic] Firstly, the IDS defends the Croatian reputation in the world wherever it goes, and this we can rightfully prove by documents, deeds, our struggle for minorities' rights, for the freedom of media, for private ownership, for individual freedom. Since we are an eminent regional party, we are quite respected in Europe, so we were invited to the European Parliament and the Council of Europe. The delegation of the Council of Europe will visit Croatia soon, including us as well. The IDS has a right to be politically active on the European political stage in its own way. As for your question, it should be said that no move has been made without previously having informed the Croatian authorities of our demands, because we do nothing behind their back, before we inform either the president or the Government of our intentions. We discuss everything in the Assembly, while the fact that some eminent European politicians, being familiar with the power structure in Croatia, show interest in talking directly with the IDS is something else.

[Jurkovic] Let us further discuss the disputed bill. As early as in September 1993 the bill was discussed for the first time, while at the party convention in Rovinj it was brought into the focus of attention again. What is the document about?

[Jakovcic] The bill was worked out following the experience and practice of European regionalism, which means that the County Assembly is to be given legislative and governing authority. It involves also the apportionment of revenue, where, if it were organized as we have envisaged, one-third would suffice for the state, while two-thirds of the revenue would remain in the region.

[Jurkovic] Ivan Herak has recently stated that President Tudjman, when he learned about the program, agreed to the possibility that two-thirds of the revenue should remain in the region, as a pilot-program for economic autonomy, but he did not want to hear about the county's having legislative authority. Can you confirm this, since you have talked with the president yourself?

[Jakovcic] Either Mr. Herak is lying, or Tudjman has really changed his stance. I am not familiar with such an assessment, but I would really be glad if the situation were so. I believe that many relations would be different if such a political will, in favor of apportioning the revenue, existed. Still, it seems to me that Herak improvised [as published] the statement, because such an apportionment means consequently the apportionment of authority. We cannot expect the government to get smaller, and to pay for everything else. Therefore it is clear that his statement is not true.

Fear of Totalitarianism

[Jurkovic] All right then, but would you still explain why the constitutional law is again being insisted upon?

[Jakovcic] Because it is natural that the Croatian Assembly should adopt the bill on the regional organization of Croatia, or at least adopt it with regard to certain regions. It is also natural that our current status cannot be as the IDS would wish it to be, because no corresponding constitutional law exists, and therefore the Bill has been worked out in compliance with the existing regulations. Constitutional law is a normal legislative form in the industrialized democratic states, by which certain regions are given their own authorities and statuses within a particular state.

[Jurkovic] Does it mean that you shall propose the same to the Assembly?

[Jakovcic] Yes, when we decide that it is necessary.

[Jurkovic] Still, it is unrealistic that the proposal would pass in the Assembly, so would you explain what a participant at the IDS convention meant when he speculated what would happen if the proposal was rejected in the Assembly?

[Jakovcic] Any policy, if it is wise, brings about actions that benefit the citizens it represents. I believe that our party will be taking such actions, so that it will propose the constitutional law at the moment when we estimate it could win the majority of votes. However, in order for a referendum to be announced some really dramatic moments should occur.

[Jurkovic] What dramatic moments?

[Jakovcic] I refer to a possible deviation of official Croatian policy toward totalitarianism. Then the IDS would decide to follow a quixotic path, doomed in advance to fail in the Assembly, but then that would be an ultimate expression of our political stance, that the will of the Istrian voters is to be respected. If Croatia diverts to dictatorship, which is mentioned as a possibility also by some former aides of the president, the question is what methods the IDS will go for. They will be democratic in any case, while the referendum is the most democratic method.

[Jurkovic] A new dimension to Istria's political position has been brought about by the general elections in Italy. The statements by the winners that the Osimo agreements [made in the 1970's, by which relations between Italy and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the fields of politics, economics, minority rights, and so forth, were defined] ought to be revised, have brought about much apprehension in Croatia. How would you comment on all that?

[Jakovcic] The Italian political scene has been overwhelmed by statements, some of which were not at all serious, but I would not say that they are dangerous for the Croatian sovereignty, because neither Istria nor Dalmatia accept any revision of the state borders. I have to say that it is normal that in any state there are those who dream about greater Italy, greater Serbia, or greater Croatia. Fortunately enough, such people are marginal. I am deeply convinced of Italy's democratic orientation and I believe that the new Italian government will also be one of the pillars of democratic Europe, following the principles of the Helsinki and the Maastricht convention.

The Lega Nord, being the leading Italian party, was first to dissociate itself from the statements by neofascists. The relations between the IDS and the Lega Nord are quite correct, and we intend to cultivate them further. The Lega Nord was the first party in Italy to state clearly and vociferously as early as in 1991 their support for the independence of Croatia, and to visit, I think, minister Separovic. By the agency of Lega Nord we shall insist that Croatia and Slovenia be admitted to the European institutions as soon as possible, and we believe that in such terms the IDS can considerably help Croatian foreign policy. Whether our Foreign Ministry will be wise and make good use of us, I do not know, but that would be quite a prudent thing to do.

[Jurcevic] In your relations with Italy the most disputed matter are the Osimo agreements, their revision. What is your attitude in that regard?

[Jakovcic] The Osimo agreements are a complex matter, regulating many things, but what is important is that they closed the history book in this region by definitely fixing the boundaries, and this is irrevocable. However, the agreements deal with many other things as well, for instance, with the property of refugees (esula), the protection of the Italian ethnic minority, economic cooperation, the traffic of goods and people, and those are clauses that require amendments, because they have not been implemented. It is only that part where we can talk about a revision of the agreement, of course in the way that friendly neighbors would do it.

Istrianism Is Reality

[Jurcevic] In addition to that there is a fear that some people's declaring themselves as Istrians benefits the Italianization of Istria. Generally, that designation is disputed, yet Istrianism is protected also by the Statute of the County.

[Jakovcic] Today, Istrianism is very much an explicit reality in Istria, and it is impossible to estimate in which way it would manifest itself further. Nobody can ignore the fact that in the 1991 census some 40,000 people declared themselves as Istrians. That has nothing to do with the Italianization of Istria, but rather with the awakened regional identity among the people who have suppressed their national being, and accepted a geo-ethnic relation they have with the region they are living in, so they feel that Istria is their micro-fatherland.

[Jurcevic] Do you think that the Istrians are a people in their own right?

[Jakovcic] They are what each of them feels to be. A people, or a deception—you can understand it whichever way you will. It is too early now to assess that phenomenon. It should be analyzed by serious, competent people, while politicians would only bring in too much passion, so I would not like to interpret what happened in the past census without an expert analysis, which will have to be made anyway.

[Jurcevic] An extraordinary convention of the IDS was held recently in Rovinj. How do you assess it?

[Jakovcic] We have adopted four declarations that give operative strength to the party's platform, and precisely determine attitudes regarding the democratization and regionalization of Croatia, the autonomy of the Istrian county, and Istria as a European region. These are documents that clearly show to all those who expected us to subvert Croatian sovereignty, that they have ended up with the short end of the stick. What I, personally, find particularly bothersome is that some distinguished Croatian politicians speculated about the convention in Rovinj, thinking out various scenarios of how it would eventually end up.

A Right of Herak and Martincic

[Jurcevic] It is interesting that your declarations have been severely attacked even by the colleagues in the regional RIDS [extension not known], that heads the Association of Regional Parties of Croatia [ARSH]. They say that your declarations are preposterous, improper, a sheer provocation....

[Jakovcic] The colleagues in RIDS have many times made very strange assessments on the IDS attitudes, and I have to add that when we had the most difficult time, the most difficult problems to deal with, they deliberately sided with those who wanted to crush our party for personal reasons. Whether the RIDS wanted to stamp out the ARSH will be shown in the course of time, but I have to tell you that I am less and less bewildered by their reactions. Although I am a great supporter of talks, I think that the room for cooperation with them is getting narrower and narrower.

[Jurcevic] Does that attitude of yours call into question the ARSH as well?

[Jakovcic] I think that the ARSH may become well established in the Croatian political space, if democratic processes prevail in it in such a way that each party acts autonomously, rather than—as was the case—to let RIDS impose its attitudes regarding the resolution of the situation in our party. I think that the RIDS has to take serious care of what is to be done further.

[Jurcevic] With respect to your party's convention, and the turbulence that occurred within the party not so long ago, how do you explain the legalization of factions within the party?

[Jakovcic] As for the functioning of the IDS in factions, that was my idea from the very day when the problems in personal relations broke out in the party. However, those who wanted to overthrow Delbianco and me did not want to accept the idea. Debeljuh's initiative to allow factions has come about somewhat late, but nevertheless, it is a constructive and well-meant initiative, so we shall set up criteria for the factional organization of the party. In that way we shall increase the degree of democracy. I have immediately asked Debeljuh to take part in The Parties' Club on Croatian television, because he is entitled to that, representing, as he does, a future faction.

[Jurkovic] Finally, I would like you to comment on the announcement of the foundation of Istria's new party by former IDS members, namely Herak and Elio Martincic.

[Jakovcic] To found a new party is their democratic right. One should pay attention to their platform and what they offer to the voters. For the time being the attitude of the IDS is neutral.

Constitutionality of Zupanija Statute Viewed

94BA0261A Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Apr 94 p 6

[Unattributed HINA article: "Croatia Has Citizens, Not the Istria Zupanija"]

[Text] *Minister of Administration Davorin Mlakar on the reasons for initiating proceedings to assess the constitutionality of the zupanija statute; many provisions of the Istria Zupanija's statute regulate issues which, on the basis of the Constitution and the law, are only within the state's purview; the zupanija does not have the right to introduce another official language; the Republic of Croatia has citizens, while the zupanijas have residents.*

Zagreb—So far the Ministry of Administration has received most of the zupanija statutes. Of the 12 statutes analyzed to date, in the statute of the Istria Zupanija the ministry has identified many provisions in conflict with the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and the law. As a result, implementation of that statute has been halted, and at the proposal of the Ministry of Administration, the government has initiated proceedings before the Constitutional Court to assess its constitutionality and legality.

According to the words of Minister of Administration Davorin Mlakar, many provisions of the Istria Zupanija's statute regulate issues which, on the basis of the Constitution and the law, are only within the state's purview. Thus, Mlakar stated, that statute violates several laws, such as, for instance, the Law on Local Self-Government and Administration, the Law on the Areas of Zupanijas, Cities, and Municipalities, the Law on Health Care, the Law on Industrial Ownership, and other separate laws.

"We believe that provisions of the Constitution have also been violated, and we therefore proposed to the government that proceedings be initiated before the Constitutional Court to assess the constitutionality and legality of the Istria Zupanija's statute. The specific result of our work is only that we have stopped that statute from being implemented, and that it is not possible to act in accordance with it, nor can general acts that would cite it be adopted. It is up to the Constitutional Court to adopt the final decision and say whether we were right or not," Mlakar said.

Violated Regulations

As an example of inconsistency with the Constitution and the laws, Minister Mlakar cited article 13 of the statute, which provides that the Istria Zupanija independently adopts regulations in specific legal areas. "That means, in other words, that it can adopt regulations in areas for which separate laws provide that they are to be adopted by the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia," Mlakar said. He explained that with the independent adoption of regulations, the Zupanija is establishing its jurisdiction in violation of the provisions of article 128 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and articles 13, 14, and 15 of the Law on Local Self-Government, as well as the provisions of the Law on Specifying Matters Within the Self-Governing Jurisdiction of Units of Local Self-Government and Administration. "That means that three fundamental regulations have been violated by that norm in the statute. Thus, for example, article 7 of the Law on Local Self-Government and Administration regulates the content of the zupanija statutes and states definitely what should be regulated by

the zupanija statute, and no general act can go beyond that legal norm and remain consistent with the law," Mlakar emphasized.

Next, he stated that contrary to the Constitution's provisions, article 13 of the Zupanija statute prescribed that the Zupanija independently adopts regulations governing the status of employed personnel. Specifically, article 54 of the Constitution prescribes the right to work and freedom of work as one of the economic, social, and cultural rights, and article 56 of the Constitution establishes that employees' rights to social security and insurance are regulated by law and a collective contract. That means, according to Mlakar, that employees' status anywhere, including in the Zupanija's bodies, is regulated solely by law and a collective contract.

Use of Language

Article 15 of the statute, which, as Mlakar stated, says that the Zupanija has decentralization as the principle of its own structure, and that it formulates administrative procedure on the basis of the principles of simple and public operation, is contrary to articles 18, 19, and 88 of the Croatian Constitution, since the Zupanija does not have the constitutional or legal right to formulate administrative procedure. "On the basis of the above-mentioned constitutional provisions, it is exclusively the Assembly's right, because the working methods of state bodies and units of local self-government can only be regulated by law," Minister Mlakar said.

He also warned about article 16 of the statute, which establishes the possibility of changing the area and headquarters of the Istria Zupanija. "The areas and headquarters are determined by the Law on the Areas of Zupanijas, Cities, and Municipalities in the Republic of Croatia, and can only be changed in the manner prescribed by the law. That cannot be transferred by any means to a lower unit, or to lower general acts," Mlakar specified.

He added that the statute also regulates the introduction of another language, in addition to Croatian, for official use. That right, by law, is only exercised by units of local self-government—municipalities, cities, and districts—which can decide in their general acts that a minority language can also be in official use, along with the Croatian language and the Latin alphabet. The Zupanija, Mlakar emphasized, does not have that right, because according to the Constitution and the laws it is a unit of local administration and self-government.

Article 1 of the statute only cites precise provisions of the Constitution, and thus says that "The Istria Zupanija is a unity of local self-government and administration, within the framework of the united and indivisible Republic of Croatia." With the opposite order, which is not unimportant (because it should say "unit of local administration and self-government"), Mlakar pointed out that certain attributes of the state are also left out, because according to article 131 of the Constitution, the Republic of Croatia is a united, indivisible, democratic, and social-welfare state.

Citizens' Rights

The statute says that the Istria Zupanija is a unit of local self-government and administration of all of its citizens, and that the Zupanija protects the freedoms and rights of its citizens. That is a right that is only exercised by the state, Mlakar warned. "Only the Republic of Croatia has citizens, and units of local self-government, municipalities, and cities have residents. Consequently, zupanijas do not have their own citizens; they are exclusively citizens of the Republic of Croatia and it guarantees them all civil rights and freedoms and human rights. That is a right reserved for the state alone, and in comparison with other countries' constitutions, one can reach the same conclusion—it cannot be left to the units of local administration and self-government to protect citizens' rights and freedoms, because that could ultimately mean that they could be protected differently," Mlakar said.

"We are not disputing a single one of those citizens' rights, and we are not questioning that part, but instead we are maintaining—and we have a basis for doing so in the Constitution and the laws—that these are rights that are exclusively within the state's purview. The state has specified by laws which form and part of legal regulations it will leave to the zupanijas, and which part the state, in order to guarantee the equality and rights of citizens before the law and the Constitution, will regulate uniformly for the entire territory of the Republic of Croatia," Minister Mlakar concluded.

Assembly Chairman Andov Interviewed

94BA0252A Skopje PULS in Macedonian 8 Apr 94 pp 14-15

[Interview with Stojan Andov, chairman of the Assembly of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, by Mirce Tomovski; place and date not given: "Permanent Nature of Democratic Changes"]

[Text] *Stojan Andov, chairman of the Assembly of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], discusses with PULS the Macedonian democratic political climate, elections, the division of power, interethnic relations, and so forth.*

[Tomovski] This summer, the second free multiparty elections are scheduled for Macedonia. A short but significant period of time has elapsed since the first elections in developing a democratic environment in our country. It has been assessed in various ways: According to some, we are living in a time of radical democratic developments; according to others, the old still prevails, and what we have now is nothing but simulated democracy. What is your reaction to the democratic processes?

[Andov] The development of democratic processes in our country was determined by their nature. However, because of particular circumstances, they did not affect several areas. To begin with, the changes that occurred turned out to be so big and so significant that the political parties and their leaderships were unable to project any further programmatic development. Now, in a period of tremendous change in the history of the Macedonian people and of Macedonia as a state, there have been several minor programmatic changes made by the parties, although the foundations of society have radically changed. This is an indication that the new processes do not enjoy firm party and political support within the democratic infrastructure. Other problems may be found in the governmental institutions, the parliament, and so forth. Despite all the pressures and the great results it was able to achieve, considering the correlation of forces, obviously there was a certain area the parliament was unable to penetrate: Reform and reorganization of the administration of the state. The present administration meets the conditions that existed in a socialist society, at a time when Macedonia was, as a republic, a structural part of another state. There has been a substantial stagnation in the restructuring of the state. It should have been followed with its conversion to a developed market economy, privatization, reprivatization, denationalization, and so forth.

[Tomovski] Can you indicate more specifically the areas in which state reform is difficult to accomplish?

[Andov] To this day we do not have a Ministry of Foreign Affairs but a Ministry of Relations with Foreign Countries. Our classifications and legal resolutions still lack legal foundations for appointing ambassadors, replacing them, and so on. This is absurd, for the Constitution makes such decisions possible. We pointed out the reorganization of the Public Bookkeeping Service. However, the existing atmosphere surprised us: We did not see any understanding of the urgent need for the modern financial institutions. We raised this question with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It is inconsistent with today's demands and needs of society. From time to time it works according to the old system and acts in a way consistent with the time and the society of the past. Ignoring the Law on Financial Inspections and others, on a parallel basis, financial inspections are conducted at the Ministry of Police, which is totally against the law. We need a reorganization of state reserves, in accordance with our stance as an independent country. In my view, there is insufficient dynamism in terms of introducing changes and promoting democratic processes. This includes the media, which are failing to promote the basic features of democratic changes as was done at the start of pluralism, at the time when we were separating ourselves from Yugoslavia. They and the journalists display little feeling for the new, for taking a risk, and for achieving a breakthrough. This, however, may be naturally the result of the problems I mentioned. That is why the forthcoming elections will be a challenge to the political forces, to the forces pledged to a further democratic breakthrough, and to a stable executive power with a clear program.

[Tomovski] In a certain way the "103" elections became a test of what we may expect in the autumn. Or, at least, that is the way they are being interpreted. They are subject to the constant critical look of parties and candidates from the opposition, who participated in them. The criticism can be formulated as "the impossibility in Macedonia to win an election democratically." What are the democratic guarantees that will ensure fair play and a democratic struggle in the autumn?

[Andov] I would rather not discuss the objections voiced by the opposition. I know, however, from worldwide practical experience, that those who do not succeed keep interfering and criticizing, which is natural. Last summer there were disagreements about the electoral laws. There was even hostility toward those who did not think that the laws must be passed immediately and such individuals were even accused of not considering the good of the state and being opposed to the elections. That is why the government was right to revoke the draft laws and ensure the application of regular procedures. This offers us greater opportunities in terms of the Council of Europe, from which we asked for experts to assess our laws. The same request was made to several U.S. institutions. This is a guarantee that we shall pass laws providing for fair and free elections. On the basis of these laws we shall ask international observers to monitor the full elections. Otherwise, what happened in relation to the "103" was an attack on democracy, for methods alien to the democratic struggle were used. The representative of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] openly threatened violence. Representatives of the Democratic Party used the method of

unsubstantiated and one-sided statements concerning the various parties and attacked the integrity of individuals with a view to compromise them. A democratic electoral atmosphere must be one of struggle but a struggle for party programs, a struggle among the capabilities of the candidates and their intellectual and political power.

[Tomovski] However it is being pointed out to you that once again there are manipulations in the passing of laws, and the parliamentary session has been extended. All of this is in order to help the governmental coalition acquire better electoral conditions for itself.

[Andov] It was the parties that requested the extension. We have never had any greater cooperation and understanding among the parties about the laws as we do now. There have been many proposals and many suggestions. The new laws are now, virtually for the first time, being formulated in a real pluralistic atmosphere. I believe that we shall be able to pass real laws for free elections and a fair electoral struggle.

[Tomovski] Now that we are on the verge of elections it has been remarked, concerning the suggested model of proportional majority, that it will not provide a true political picture of Macedonia in the next parliament.

[Andov] In all countries the political picture remains within the framework of its basic purposes and needs at that specific period. If in the forthcoming period we need a stable authority in Macedonia, clearly we have no interest in letting a number of small parties enter parliament, with two or three representatives, and so on. For in that case it would be impossible to secure the existence of a legislative body with the required political weight needed to create a stable and responsible executive authority. We have about 60 political parties. Does anyone truly think that there are 60 real options for Macedonia? Therefore, this is a rustic, folkloric, carnival, country fair atmosphere rather than a true reflection of the need for political development of the state.

[Tomovski] The parliament is one of the key factors of parliamentary democracy. It is a member of the Interparliamentary Union. At the same time, however, the parliament is being constantly criticized by the public and by the political parties. What is its real position in terms of the two extremes in such assessments?

[Andov] I think that our parliament functions in accordance with European standards. The problems appeared wherever a two-thirds majority was required. I believe that the Assembly established itself as the central legislative and political institution in the period between the two elections. At the same time, it took all the steps required for the functioning of an independent state. The criticism on the part of the public is undifferentiated: It is more a criticism on the part of circles that would like the work to be done more rapidly and efficiently. However, they forget that the dynamics and efficiency of the work depend above all on the correlation of political forces. Another criticism comes from the nonparliamentary parties. They are displeased for being outside the parliament. In all countries such parties play no role in society. The fact that in Macedonia the opposite is taking place is probably the result of our inexperience and the fact that, according to some, they could not become members of parliament within the first electoral period was a mistake.

[Tomovski] What are the chances that the new basic laws that so far have not been passed by the parliament may be passed before the start of the new elections?

[Andov] I mentioned the administration of the state. This includes justice. I believe that despite all efforts it would be impossible in this parliament to rally 80 votes for any given project. It is impossible to have 80 votes, given the breakdown of political forces.

[Tomovski] Almost half of the townships in the Republic of Macedonia are not functioning for a variety of reasons. However, it is a fact that the people are having problems in their daily life. Yet the most important law on local self-government was not passed.

[Andov] Obviously, there are difficulties concerning the functioning of the townships given the absence of regulations in that area. The old regulations and statutory laws remain along with some government resolutions. However, there has been no definitive solution based on the Constitution. The law on local self-government was not passed. However, there are townships without a township assembly. Otherwise, all townships function one way or another. It would be better to pass a law on local self-government. It is obvious, however, that we have included in this law an excessive number of problems to be resolved. This includes interethnic relations. However, disputes concerning the law do not pertain to local self-government but to other issues which this law must resolve. Its passing was delayed by the government for a variety of disagreements, which point at the nature of the demands raised with the amendments. The government determined that the nature of the amendments makes an 80-vote majority impossible.

[Tomovski] Macedonia is developing its own original model of interethnic democracy. However, the political parties of the various nationalities are dissatisfied and are also the result of their internationalization. What is your view of Macedonian interethnic conditions?

[Andov] The main directions in resolving problems of interethnic relations are formulated in the Constitution and we do not have to exceed such frameworks or such methods in resolving them. There is no need for redefining interethnic relations. Those who think that by making statements abroad a somewhat different picture of the actual situation may be created are playing the wrong card. I believe that such problems are of no threat to Macedonia.

[Tomovski] According to the Constitution, the classical division of powers exists in Macedonia. How do you assess relations among the parliament, the head of state, and the government?

[Andov] I believe that a major step was taken with the constitutional resolutions according to which the executive power was granted to the government and the president. A more secure future and a more stable democratic development demand that some basic state interests be closely tied to the president's power. That is why we need a stronger presidential authority. This can be seen in other democratic countries as well. In my view, the present division of powers between the president and the government is not the best possible. Some changes must be made in the exercise of presidential power in order to achieve a better stability in the executive branch. This also means reciprocal responsibility. The parliament can and does have the right to replace the president. However, the possibility must be contemplated also of disbanding the parliament by the president. This would strengthen responsibility and the balance of power. Presently, the power is not balanced. At one point, the parliament made the president of the Republic equal to the parliamentarians. In my view there is no country in which one drags the name and the functions of the president in current party quarrels, involving ordinary demands. Respect must be shown for the institutions. The government is something different. Within this period of time the situation in Macedonia has somewhat changed, and we believe that this must be taken into consideration.

[Tomovski] Is this not in line with the criticism precisely of the fact that Macedonia is slowly abandoning the basic definition of parliamentary democracy and switching to a presidential system?

[Andov] A parliamentary democracy exists also wherever there is a presidential system. We cannot say that there is no parliamentary democracy in France today. A parliamentary democracy should not have any features of self-government and views about some kind of plebeian democracy, a democracy of the streets. Such a democracy cannot be considered a government. It cannot govern and administer the state. It may be of some importance but only in the course of establishment of the state. Otherwise, once it is established, there must be a variety of institutions with a variety of duties.

[Tomovski] The involvement of history in European political life is being condemned. However, of late efforts are being to patch former Yugoslavia together; an orthodox association is being created. This includes the intention of involving Macedonia.

[Andov] Europe and the rest of the world have tried everything possible in this area. They tried to have different states and in Croatia and Bosnia people started fighting and do not know how to stop it. The appearance of a variety of ideas cannot be blocked. It is quite important for the world to have a clear view of our position concerning each one of these ideas. We have proved, among others, that our withdrawal from former Yugoslavia indicates that this is a way of preventing the war. This proved that this was a right step to take. Of the current options available in Europe this proved to be the right one. That is why we should not be afraid of ideas expressing the despair of some circles. What matters is that we have a clear line well-known to the world. For the time being we are succeeding and I believe that we shall succeed in the future in making it known to all.

Slovene, Croatian Officials on Italian Strategy

AU1205154994 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 12 May 94

[Excerpts] The delegations of the Slovene and Croatian parliamentary commissions for international affairs met in Ljubljana this morning. The Croatian delegation was led by Dr. Zarko Domljan and the Slovene by Zoran Thaler. Nadja Pengov reports:

[Begin Pengov recording] The topics of today's talks, which were assessed as good, covered more or less three issues: The position of both countries in Europe, mutual relations, and dangerous signals that have recently been coming from Italy. Regarding the first, both states share similar goals, they are merely in different positions, the position of Slovenia being better today due to objective circumstances.

What about mutual relations? We did not hide the fact that some problems exist, it was stated, however, these are not such as to damage the otherwise good relations between the countries. The delegations concluded that the work of the commissions for borders and the agreement on border cooperation should be accelerated. The Slovene side particularly singled out problems connected to property. This agreement is already prepared, however, Croatia is making it conditional on the resolution of issues concerning the nuclear power plant and the debts of Ljubljanska Banka.

During the talks they also touched on the speculation that Dr. Zarko Domljan was negotiating a Slovene-Croatian-Bosnia-Herzegovina federation with an unidentified Slovene politician. It was established that this was a hoax. Dr. Domljan explained his vision about future relations between the countries by saying that Slovenia is a priority for Croatia, that the countries must link up solely on the basis of interests, into a sort of a customs, monetary, or some other type of union. [passage omitted]

Relations with Italy. The degree of consensus between Slovenia and Croatia is most important here. There will be no alteration of borders and this is out of the question. The agreements must be observed. There will be no new negotiations about the prevailing agreements.

The question of compensation for the former property of exiles [optanti] has been solved and the countries will not negotiate this here either. The governments of both countries should agree as soon as possible on the amount of compensation that Slovenia and Croatia should pay. Once this is done, they will, because of Italy's [word indistinct] which does not provide an account number to which the debt could be paid, do this themselves and inform the Italian side where its money is. Dr. Zarko Domljan here stressed the importance of Slovenia and Croatia having a joint action strategy on these issues. [end recording]

Federal

Central Bank Granted Foreign Currency Loans

AU1205203794 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 12 May 94

[Report by Mirjana Jevtic—recorded]

[Text] [Jevtic] According to the recently adopted Law on Foreign Exchange Loans, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has authorized its central bank to assume loans in the amount of $300 million both in-country and abroad in the name of and for the federal state. In order to collect this sum, the National Bank of Yugoslavia has signed the first contract on loans with Belgrade Bank, Invest Bank, and Beobank. The job is worth $10 million and at the same marks the beginning of the realization of Financial Pool No. 2 of the Program of Monetary Reconstruction and Economic Recovery. According to Nikola Stanic, vice governor of the National Bank, the loans granted will be transferred to the country's foreign exchange reserves and will be used as a foreign exchange backing for the new dinar. This will at the same time represent the additional financial boost for furthering economic activities in the country.

[Belgrade Bank Director Ljubisa Igic, identified by caption] We see our interests here. The conditions under which we are granting the loan to the National Bank, that is, to the state of Yugoslavia are in fact market conditions ....

[Jevtic] The fact that banks are now giving their own money to support the program means that they have to look after it in a different, more serious manner than they have done to date.

[Igic] Certainly. In fact, this money will again come to banking and financial channels through the economy. It will be a basis for general economic activity in the coming period. This money has not been given away for good ignoring this economy, our bank's savers, and our shareholders.

[Jevtic] By the way, the Belgrade Bank, Invest Bank, and Beobank were the first to grant foreign exchange loans to the National Bank of Yugoslavia in conformity with the adopted law. Therefore, the loan has been given to two years with a one-year delay in payment and a flexible domicile rate of exchange for individual foreign currencies.

This week and the next, the management of the National Bank of Yugoslavia will sign individual contracts with several dozen banks so that the planned $300 million can be ensured as soon as possible.

Belgrade Outlines Stance on Geneva Meeting

LD1205144494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1147 GMT 12 May 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, May 12 (TANJUG)—The foreign ministers of the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations will have their final say at a meeting in Geneva as regards the framework of a political settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, diplomatic circles in Belgrade said on Thursday. This platform for the conclusion of the two-year-old civil war among the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats could include three major parts, the diplomatic circles said.

The first part is an unconditional ceasefire in the entire territory of ex-Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on which the Bosnian Serb leadership has been insisting for months and which, nevertheless, has invariably been rejected by the Bosnian Muslims. The second part is the territorial delineation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The prevailing opinion in diplomatic circles in Belgrade is that the Geneva meeting will take as its point of departure the map, previously proposed by the European Union, envisaging virtually that Bosnian Serbs get 49 percent of the entire territory, while the Bosnian Muslims and Croats should get 51 percent. The third part of the Geneva talks could concern the U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro), i.e. their linking with the first two parts and consequently their lifting as soon as these two parts are completed.

Bearing all that in mind, a decision to be later adopted by participants in a summit on Bosnia-Herzegovina could be taken in Geneva, the circles said. A deal on the 'division of tasks' should not, of course, be ruled out which means that in the process of implementing that plan the United States would be in charge of the Bosnian Muslims, Russia in charge of the Bosnian Serbs and Germany in charge of the Bosnian Croats.

It is yet to be seen what the outcome of the latest meeting in Geneva will be, where in the past two years many attempts have been made to settle the Bosnian conflict. None of these attempts, however, have been successful and, as it has been announced in Moscow, Washington, London and Brussels, all participants in the Geneva meeting are now resolute to bring this issue to an end.

In such circumstances, the Geneva meeting could also be the point of decision, the diplomatic circles said.

Government Addresses Weapons Smuggling Issue

AU1205163694 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 12 May 94

[Excerpt] The Federal Government has submitted answers to questions posed by deputies at the Federal Assembly. The government suggests that the law on military schools and military scientific institutions be adopted in an urgent procedure. Let us listen to a report by Mirjana Protic:

[Begin Protic recording] The Federal Ministry of Defense asserts that there has so far been no incidence of a Yugoslav Army warehouse being broken into. This is

the gist of the reply to a question by a deputy. The weapons used by individuals and illegal military [words indistinct] of members of the NCA [expansion unknown] so far mostly originate from battlefields in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are also brought through various smuggling channels from Turkey via Albania. Certain humanitarian organizations such as Merhamet [word indistinct] channels for smuggling arms to the territory of Raska Region. Several smuggling channels that involved former members of the Yugoslav People's Army of Muslim nationality who had gone over to the Army of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, have also been discovered. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Bankers Protest National Bank Measures

94BA0260B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Apr 94 p 13

[Article by Lj. Cudomirovic: "The Money Is Going to Reserves Instead of to Loans"]

[Text] The decision of the National Bank of Yugoslavia [NBJ] to raise overnight the so-called mandatory reserve for dinar deposits from 10 to 15 percent (on new dinars) and from 3 to 7 percent (on old dinars) is clumsy to say the least, and its consequences will have the greatest impact on production. After all, it was adopted in a period of what was already an appreciable reduction of bank liquidity, so that many who found themselves in an extremely unenviable situation are being charged with sabotaging the program by being slow to extend loans for production, while at the same time funds are being withdrawn from the accounts that are actually the only ones from which they can extend credits to the economy. In practical terms, many among them, for all practical purposes the largest ones, have been compelled to seek a way out either through premature withdrawal of credit or a forced sale of the foreign exchange, which they were thought to have in much greater quantities than the facts indicate.

This was all reported in yesterday's meeting of the Committee for Banking and Financial Affairs in the Serbian Economic Chamber, where the bankers stated their position on the most urgent matters of monetary policy and bank liquidity.

According to Dragoljub Vukosavljevic, president of Union Bank, the NBJ and other banks have a vital interest in the fate of the program for monetary reconstruction, but the higher liquidity of the banks is not the main culprit for the pegging that is being done. What is more, the figure that no less than 27 percent of the total money supply is now in the hands of the public was in his opinion a much stronger reason for alarm than the threat to further implementation of the program represented by the amounts in the giro accounts of the banks. After all, compared to 26 March, when the banks had a total of 187 million dinars, by 9 April they had only 79 million dinars, and today they have a total of barely somewhere between 50 and 60 million, including the cash in cash drawers, without which they cannot operate.

In his opinion, this situation with bank liquidity and the most recent measure to raise the mandatory reserves, and on that basis withdraw no less than 30 million dinars from bank giro accounts, could be a severe blow to the credit financing of production, especially agriculture, which is right now on the threshold of large seasonal investments in planting operations. The situation is even so absurd that some of the banks will not be able to raise the mandatory reserves without being overdrawn.

Marko Steljic, president of Jugobanka (JU Bank) Joint-Stock Company, said the issue of whether there is a surplus of money in circulation or less money is the key issue whose resolution is being insisted on equally by both the banks and enterprise collectives which have already undertaken to invigorate production. The present level of credit financing of the economy (700 million dinars) is not enough, because that amount could only satisfy the annual needs of Jugobanka. In his opinion, then, the banks themselves will have to undertake urgent reorganization of their own business operation and reduction of the size of their staff, but that also applies both to the NBJ and all the others.

Zika Ilic, president of the PKB Bank, was of the opinion that the decision of the NBJ to increase the mandatory reserves was hasty and not backed up by a carefully studied calculation. He also put the quite specific question of whether this country needs such a large staff in the National Bank of Yugoslavia, in the settlement system, but also in the commercial banks themselves, when it is thought that no less than half of the staff are unnecessary. Dr. Milovan Milutinovic, chairman of the board and general secretary of the Association of Yugoslav Banks, and Milomir Spasic, president of Slavija Bank, recalled at the end that the NBJ also has far more delicate mechanisms and instruments for determining the total money supply that would equally satisfy both the invigoration of production without being an additional source of inflation and without affording an opportunity for the pegging of foreign exchange. In that connection, the bank has agreed that there is now an urgent need to bring various securities onto the financial scene.

Biographic Data on Information Minister

94BA0260D Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 25 Apr 94 p 54

[Article by Jovan Dulovic: "The Career of the Federal Minister for Information"]

[Text] **Year and place of birth**: 1947, the village Gligovac near Smederevska Palanka, Socialist Republic of Serbia.

What he is known for: As minister for information in the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Government he announced expulsion of journalists back on 13 June of last year ("Is it not illogical for so many falsehoods about

the FRY to go out into the world, when credentials have not been taken away from a single journalist") and he recently decided to prohibit some 14 foreign journalists from working because of "satanization of the FRY and the Serbian people," which divided the domestic public and embittered the world public.

What they reproach him for in the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia]: He is a member of the most hard-line current among the incumbent members of the government and an unwavering advocate of the motto: Whoever is not with us must go. Ratomir Vico, newly appointed information minister in the Serbian Government, recently explained to him on a television program (there is a question of how serious he was) that Radio-TV Serbia must also broadcast the relevant views of opposition parties and groupings. Ignjatovic thanked him for having supplemented and spelled out his previously expressed thought that government television must exclusively represent the interests of the state.

What the opposition has against him: As director of Radio-TV Serbia he did not allow coverage of the Saint Vitus' Day Rally. He explained his decision this way: "There is no reason for TV Belgrade to cover the rally when this is already being done by Independent TV Studio B and TV Politika" (BORBA, 3 July 1992). Some 17 deputies of DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia], New Democracy, the Democratic Party, the People's Party of Montenegro, and the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro in the Citizens Chamber of the Assembly demanded that Ignjatovic be dismissed because of the expulsion of the foreign journalists, because that decision "placed the FRY and its citizens in still greater isolation from the world."

How he got into politics: When KOMUNIST was shut down, where he restated in his own words the speeches of party bigwigs and said that there was no salvation for us without self-management of the working class, he went over to POLITIKA EKSPRES as an expert on the economy, but because he was not good at writing commentary, he thought about opening a grocery store. In the end, he gave that up and was elected a member of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which soon fell apart. Consistent with the policy of his party, he joined the management team of POLITIKA EKSPRES: editor in chief Slobodan Jovanovic, former executive secretary of the city committee of the League of Communists, and Dragoljub Milanovic, also a former executive secretary of the League of Communists of Serbia.

How he won political points: His rating on the list of personnel jumped up sharply when with his perspicacity and comprehensive analysis he discovered and published that "fascistoid Ante Markovic is driving the people into beggary" and "intends to destroy Serbia and Yugoslavia." He announced to the public that "it was during the term of A. Markovic that inflation reached the highest level in the history of this country" (POLITIKA EKSPRES, 11 November 1990).

What he has against certain periodicals: In an article entitled "The Independent Are Sullying the People" (VECERNJE NOVOSTI, 6 December 1993), in speaking about some of the media, Ignjatovic said that they "usually say that the present government is fascist."

What he promised: Announcing the "offensive and preventive strategy of the ministry which he heads" (POLITIKA, 7 May 1993), Ignjatovic made the public announcement: "We have formed an intersector group which will take the offensive in supplying information in the FRY. We are studying the moves of all our media 'friends' and we will be ready and waiting with everything cooked up in advance so that we can take appropriate steps in good time" (VECERNJE NOVOSTI, 13 June 1993). The results of that group are not evident, at least for the present.

What his qualifications are: He graduated from the School of Philosophy at Belgrade University and took a master's degree in the School of Economics.

What he should be afraid of: Those who put him in the post of minister.

What inspires him: The investigative journalism of his young colleagues, of which he was an example at EKSPRES. In this style: "A full barrel of Serbian eyes from which the ustashi were making burek was discovered in Mirkovci," "Ante Markovic stole 28 kg of prosciutta from Uzice," "Even a little fellow is stronger than the embargo," "The wolf is lunching with Franjo," "Some 60 passengers were removed from the train and slaughtered in cornfields. The bodies still have not been found...."

Serbia

'Suspicion' Surrounding Death of Journalist

94BA0260C Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 18 Apr 94 p 52

[Article by U.K. and J.D.: "Dada Vujasinovic's Death"]

[Text] The death of Radislava "Dada" Vujasinovic, a journalist of the Belgrade newspaper DUGA, has evoked reflections about the risks of this profession, but also about the effectiveness of the police and the court system. In a brief police report marked "confidential" of the duty service of the SUP [Secretariat for Internal Affairs] for 11 April of this year, there is a statement that "on 9 April at 0100 hours Radislava Vujasinovic, born 10 February 1964 in Capljina, committed suicide with a bullet from a hunting rifle in the apartment of her parents in New Belgrade." The report goes on to say that the body was transferred to the Institute for Forensic Medicine for an autopsy by order of the investigating judge of the district court in Belgrade.

Meanwhile, there has been no official announcement, and the record of the inquest, we have learned, has been sent by the police to the district public prosecutor's office

in Belgrade. The complete file should consist of the autopsy finding, a sketch of the scene of the event, photographs, and the report of the technical department on gunpowder traces ("the paraffin glove"). It has been learned that the prosecutor has asked the police for additional analysis in order to determine whether this was really a suicide or a crime (for example, forced suicide). A copy of the report also went to the Department for Violent and Sexual Crimes of the Belgrade SUP, whose inspectors, even before the order from the prosecutor's office, began to check out certain details.

A Lapse

It is of interest that the inquest was not attended by the duty investigating judge of the district court, nor by the duty deputy district public prosecutor, which is a lapse sometimes difficult to make up for. It seems that in this case the police did not even inform the duty investigating judge, in spite of the fact that the death of a person well-known to the public was involved. Thus, room was created for suspicion and speculation, especially in the knowledge that Dada Vujasinovic had criticized many bigwigs in writing about the army, the police, crime, corruption, the war.... Many journalists, it is true, peacefully "cover" these topics without being tempted to threaten their own security. Dada Vujasinovic, however, took her job seriously.

The threats she had been receiving were also serious. One of the most characteristic was published in her article "The Survivors Will Be Innocent" (DUGA, No. 513, covering the period from 23 October to 5 November of last year). In the article, she writes clearly:

"I asked him nicely to comment on the wave of violence against well-off individuals. Unfortunately, the otherwise well-bred and accommodating people's deputy Raznatovic snapped back: 'If you are interested in who is next, write that it is you and that I told you so.'"

Zeljko "Arkan" Raznatovic, former people's deputy, was not the only one: Dada Vujasinovic had been threatened by known and unknown, beginning with the anonymous thugs from Krajina who were bothered by her article about the arrest of Veljko Dzakula last fall, and going all the way to the "group of pilots" who sent her a threatening letter in which they charged that she contributed to the removal of General Bozidar Stevanovic, known as Mika Sprajs, former commander of the Air Force, who failed to become minister of the armed forces. Aside from threats which forced her to purchase a reinforced door (she lived alone), Dada Vujasinovic was also exposed to other types of pressures: Borisav Jovic, a top official in the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] and a former member of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Presidency, filed a private complaint against her, allegedly because of slander. The trial was postponed several times, once even on grounds that "the judge had chicken pox" (!?), which drove the visibly upset Dada Vujasinovic to declare that one day she would sit in the front row when Borisav Jovic was tried for war crimes.

Debt

One gets the impression that these pressures and the fact that what she wrote did not fit into the increasingly obvious "hyperpatriotic" changes in the editorial policy of DUGA certainly had an impact on Dada Vujasinovic. However, there was no indication in her behavior that she might be thinking about suicide. At this point, of course, nothing can be said with confidence, but it is of interest that her family did not publish a death notice, no speech was made at the funeral, and the funeral was conducted according to Orthodox custom. The family is silent for the present and waiting for the official version of the event, and in the editorial offices of DUGA there is uneasiness and fear. Many questions are being put: Who first entered the apartment, and how? Was anything taken from the apartment, and what? Did Dada Vujasinovic have documentation, and where is it?

Answers should be expected from the district public prosecutor's office, which is to judge whether there are grounds for possible initiation of an investigation, or whether it will confirm the original conclusion of the police. The Executive Committee of the Independent Association of Serbian Journalists has announced that it is calling upon the government to "make an investigation as soon as possible and make public all the circumstances which led to the tragic death of our colleague." The Democratic Party is also calling for light to be shed on this event, saying in its press release that this is not just a question of a legal obligation, but also a debt "to a journalist who dared to write about things others did not dare to write about." There is no need to emphasize that increasingly frightened individuals also expect the death of Dada Vujasinovic to be cleared up, and the shaken confidence in the rule of law might be restored at least a little provided the police and prosecutor's office do their job properly.

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